16 November 2005 in Journal of Population Economics
This paper analyzes the effects of population aging on the preferred legal retirement age. What is revealed is the crucial role that the indirect ‘macro’ effects resulting from a change in the legal retirement age play in the optimal decision. Two social security systems are studied. Under a defined contribution scheme, aging lowers the preferred legal retirement age. However, under a defined pension scheme, the retirement age is delayed. This result shows the relevance of correctly choosing the parameter affected by the dependency ratio in the design of the social security programme.
1 June 2016 in Experimental Economics
We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.
13 February 2007 in Economic Inquiry
1 September 2013 in Experimental Economics
The paper reports an experimental study on a promotion-demotion mechanism to mitigate the free-rider problem in a voluntary contribution setting. The mechanism hierarchically splits a group in two; we refer to one subgroup as the Major league and to the other as the minor league. The most cooperative subject of the minor league is switched with the least cooperative subject in the Major league. The results reveal a significant increase of cooperation levels in both leagues relative to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We argue that a lack of sequentially-rational beliefs about continuation payoffs in Major and minor leagues leads to higher equilibrium contributions. The data suggest beyond that, the promotion-demotion mechanism regroups subjects deliberately according to their cooperativeness.
14 January 2010 in SERIEs
This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, first, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. The results suggest that governments attempting to postpone the legal retirement age should increase the degree of intra-generational redistribution of the pension system in order to make the reform aimed at more easily achievable. More importantly, the most productive individuals could support some degree of redistribution to that aim.
30 March 2012 in Revista Internacional de Sociologia
El objetivo principal de este artículo es investigar las tasas de descuento temporal entre los individuos obesos tratados quirúrgicamente y que pertenecen a una asociación de personas interesadas en controlar su peso. también se analiza si el nivel socio-económico y los rasgos de la personalidad explican las diferencias existentes. las tasas de descuento diferido se obtuvieron utilizando los incentivos monetarios reales en un experimento económico donde a los sujetos se les pide elegir entre una menor y más inmediata recompensa o una recompensa mayor diferida. los rasgos de personalidad son examinados usando el modelo de cinco factores. Curiosamente, nuestros resultados muestran que las personas obesas muestran tasa de descuento menores al grupo de referencia. estas diferencias no pueden explicarse por los rasgos de personalidad. Nosotros sostenemos que la gente obesa no debería mostrar mayores tasas de descuento. De hecho, la conciencia y el compromiso, en lugar de su actual índice de masa corporal, parecen jugar un papel más importante en la determinación de este parámetro.