1 June 2019 in Management Science
This paper seeks to understand the relational factors that may affect the decisions of both third-party raters and service providers in a setting where service providers compete with one another. We employ laboratory economics experiments to examine how removing anonymity and allowing for repeated interactions between the rater and the service provider impact both the ratings assigned by the rater and the quality levels expended by the service provider. Our methodology enables us to observe the true quality level chosen by a service provider, which allows us to accurately detect any bias in the assessment of the third-party rater. The experimental results show that the decisions of both the rater and the service provider are very sensitive to the relational factors that govern their interaction. When the rater and the service provider know each other’s identities, we observe a high proportion of overrating even though raters earn less monetary rewards for doing so, and the propensity to overrate is even stronger with repeated interactions. Furthermore, the service provider chooses low quality levels. We develop and estimate a model that captures the rater’s psychological trade-off between remaining objective and helping the service provider compete in the marketplace, and the evolution of the service provider’s beliefs about the rater’s preferences. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3082 . This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.
2 October 2019 in Journal of Management Information Systems
The instant access to gambling anytime, anywhere, has made online gambling highly habitual for some people. As a result, some online gamblers choose to volitionally enable the website-provided disruptive information technology (IT) features to control their gambling routines. The objective of this study is to examine the role of these features in regulating online gambling behavior. It is worthwhile to note that in this research, we do not make the assumption that habitual or regular online gambling is a bad thing; nor does the development of our conceptual framework — which focuses on the effect of disruptive IT features and moderating roles of individual regularity and game type in modifying gambling routines — depend on such an assumption. Drawing on theories of habitual automaticity and habit disruption, the conceptual framework theorizes the efficacy and mechanism of disruptive features while taking into account heterogeneity in individual regularity and game type. We tested the model using data collected over 10 years from 3,526 users of a gambling website. First, we found that individuals’ repetitive gambling patterns weakened as the duration of exposure to disruptive features increased. Second, the behavior of more regular gamblers was more resistant to the disruptive features, because more regular gamblers exhibited a stronger habitual pattern. Third, disruptive features were less effective on sports games compared with casino games, because sports gamblers tended to exhibit stronger gambling routines. Overall, the present study contributes to the information systems (IS) literature by clarifying how simple IT features may disrupt unwanted and difficult-to-break online gambling habits as judged by the gamblers. Our findings are likeliest to apply to broader areas of online services in which the application in question is integrated into everyday life and the system can offer a disruptive mechanism.
1 July 2020 in Management Science
We model an expert review system where two producers competing for market share each are evaluated by two raters. Employing economics experiments, the paper examines how the rater’s incentive to provide objective feedback can be distorted in the presence of social ties and different penalty structures for assigning unobjective ratings. The results reject the self-interested model. We find that raters assign more biased ratings to help the producer they know compete, and this distortion is exacerbated when the reputation cost for rating unobjectively is lowered. Counterintuitively, when both of the raters know the same producer, the likelihood of biased ratings drops significantly. To explain the empirical regularities, we develop a behavioral economics model and show that the rater’s utility function should account not only for social preferences toward the producer, but also the rater’s psychological aversion toward favoring a producer more than the other rater. Our findings demonstrate that it is critical for policymakers to be cognizant of the nonpecuniary factors that can influence behavior in expert review systems. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
1 November 2023 in Production and Operations Management
6 March 2025 in European Journal of Information Systems