Kevin Chung

Kevin Chung

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Kevin Chung

Wisconsin School of Business, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2019 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KKKeehyung Kim
Keehyung Kim
KCKevin Chung
Kevin Chung
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
This paper seeks to understand the relational factors that may affect the decisions of both third-party raters and service providers in a setting where service providers compete with one another. We employ laboratory economics experiments to examine how removing anonymity and allowing for repeated interactions between the rater and the service provider impact both the ratings assigned by the rater and the quality levels expended by the service provider. Our methodology enables us to observe the true quality level chosen by a service provider, which allows us to accurately detect any bias in the assessment of the third-party rater. The experimental results show that the decisions of both the rater and the service provider are very sensitive to the relational factors that govern their interaction. When the rater and the service provider know each other’s identities, we observe a high proportion of overrating even though raters earn less monetary rewards for doing so, and the propensity to overrate is even stronger with repeated interactions. Furthermore, the service provider chooses low quality levels. We develop and estimate a model that captures the rater’s psychological trade-off between remaining objective and helping the service provider compete in the marketplace, and the evolution of the service provider’s beliefs about the rater’s preferences. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3082 . This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

1 July 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KCKevin Chung
Kevin Chung
KKKeehyung Kim
Keehyung Kim
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
We model an expert review system where two producers competing for market share each are evaluated by two raters. Employing economics experiments, the paper examines how the rater’s incentive to provide objective feedback can be distorted in the presence of social ties and different penalty structures for assigning unobjective ratings. The results reject the self-interested model. We find that raters assign more biased ratings to help the producer they know compete, and this distortion is exacerbated when the reputation cost for rating unobjectively is lowered. Counterintuitively, when both of the raters know the same producer, the likelihood of biased ratings drops significantly. To explain the empirical regularities, we develop a behavioral economics model and show that the rater’s utility function should account not only for social preferences toward the producer, but also the rater’s psychological aversion toward favoring a producer more than the other rater. Our findings demonstrate that it is critical for policymakers to be cognizant of the nonpecuniary factors that can influence behavior in expert review systems. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

1 April 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KCKevin Chung
Kevin Chung
We study a rebate program in the credit card industry where the firm automatically processed the rebate earned by consumers with flexible and effortless redemption opportunities in future transactions. Contrary to what the normative economic theory would predict, we document that consumers frequently failed to redeem their rebate. Given this observation, we examine what may have been the primary driving force behind this pattern and the implications for the firm. We provide evidence that the phenomenon that we observe in our study is a result of cardholders being influenced by the way their outcomes were framed. We find that redemption incidences coincide with episodes where rebates are a larger portion of the amount spent. On the basis of the empirical regularities, we formulate a model of cardholder behavior where the cardholder experiences increasing psychological utility when rebate redemption yields a deeper discount. The model estimates indicate that, although delayed redemption left customers monetarily worse off in each transaction (cardholders passed up on average $0.76 of card-level benefits to experience greater psychological utility), once the psychological utility is taken into account, customers were shown to fare better overall. For the firm, in addition to the card benefits that were passed up, the psychological utility generated an additional average benefit of $1.21 per redemption. Finally, through counterfactuals we show that carefully designing a rebate program that takes into account consumers’ psychological redemption utility can further benefit both consumers and firms. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

25 June 2021 in Journal of Marketing Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
KCKevin Chung
Kevin Chung
When using group-based commission plans to motivate their sales force, should firms always compensate salespeople based on the average of team members’ sales outcomes? The theory suggests that when team members are heterogeneous in sales abilities, the proposed maximum contract (where the team output is set by the largest individual sales output) dominates the average contract (where the team output is determined by the average output of team members) in terms of overall team effort. This is because the stronger team member will exert higher effort under the maximum contract compared with the average contract, and this increase exceeds the decrease in the weaker team member’s effort. The authors validate the theoretical predictions by employing two laboratory experiments to provide a causal test of the theory and two randomized field experiments to deliver additional corroborating evidence. Overall, the experimental results are consistent and broadly confirm the theoretical predictions, pointing to the substantial gains from implementing the maximum contract when team members are heterogeneous in abilities. Interestingly, the weaker team members exert similar effort across the maximum and average contracts, although the theory predicts higher effort under the latter.