Noah Lim

Noah Lim

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Noah Lim

NUS Global Asia Institute, Singapore 117602, Singapore; and NUS Business School, Singapore 117602, Singapore

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2019 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KKKeehyung Kim
Keehyung Kim
KCKevin Chung
Kevin Chung
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
This paper seeks to understand the relational factors that may affect the decisions of both third-party raters and service providers in a setting where service providers compete with one another. We employ laboratory economics experiments to examine how removing anonymity and allowing for repeated interactions between the rater and the service provider impact both the ratings assigned by the rater and the quality levels expended by the service provider. Our methodology enables us to observe the true quality level chosen by a service provider, which allows us to accurately detect any bias in the assessment of the third-party rater. The experimental results show that the decisions of both the rater and the service provider are very sensitive to the relational factors that govern their interaction. When the rater and the service provider know each other’s identities, we observe a high proportion of overrating even though raters earn less monetary rewards for doing so, and the propensity to overrate is even stronger with repeated interactions. Furthermore, the service provider chooses low quality levels. We develop and estimate a model that captures the rater’s psychological trade-off between remaining objective and helping the service provider compete in the marketplace, and the evolution of the service provider’s beliefs about the rater’s preferences. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3082 . This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

1 July 2020 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KCKevin Chung
Kevin Chung
KKKeehyung Kim
Keehyung Kim
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
We model an expert review system where two producers competing for market share each are evaluated by two raters. Employing economics experiments, the paper examines how the rater’s incentive to provide objective feedback can be distorted in the presence of social ties and different penalty structures for assigning unobjective ratings. The results reject the self-interested model. We find that raters assign more biased ratings to help the producer they know compete, and this distortion is exacerbated when the reputation cost for rating unobjectively is lowered. Counterintuitively, when both of the raters know the same producer, the likelihood of biased ratings drops significantly. To explain the empirical regularities, we develop a behavioral economics model and show that the rater’s utility function should account not only for social preferences toward the producer, but also the rater’s psychological aversion toward favoring a producer more than the other rater. Our findings demonstrate that it is critical for policymakers to be cognizant of the nonpecuniary factors that can influence behavior in expert review systems. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

1 November 2020 in Marketing Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JLJia Li
Jia Li
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
HCHua Chen
Hua Chen
Using a field experiment, this paper examines how salespeople adjust their effort when coworker's ability changes, under different compensation contracts in a retailing context.

1 December 2021 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SHSung H. Ham
Sung H. Ham
IKIngrid Koch
Ingrid Koch
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
JWJiabin Wu
Jiabin Wu
This paper experimentally examines a conflict of interest (COI) situation in which a third-party reviewer provides a product assessment for a firm but also potentially benefits economically from the assessed firm’s rival. We present a behavioral economics model to examine how reviewer competition and reciprocal relationships between firms and reviewers affect decision outcomes, followed by an experiment to investigate the model predictions. The experimental results are consistent with the behavioral model predictions. In particular, we empirically document a COI problem where the third-party reviewer’s report is biased, and consequently, the assessed firm underinvests in product quality. We find that this adverse result is driven by reciprocity between the third-party reviewer and the assessed firm’s rival. When we introduce an additional reviewer such that there is competition among the third-party reviewers, reporting biases are alleviated, and firms raise product quality levels. Interestingly, however, when informal agreements exist between the third-party reviewer and the assessed firm’s rival, reviewer competition exacerbates biases even more compared with the case without competition, further undermining the assessed firm’s incentive to invest in product quality. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.

29 June 2021 in Scientific Reports
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
APAlessandro Del Ponte
Alessandro Del Ponte
PDPeter DeScioli
Peter DeScioli
AMAidas Masiliunas
Aidas Masiliunas
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
How can countries cooperate to shelter migrants? We use experimental economics to study the distinct challenges of cooperation in migrant crises. We designed an economic game, pass the buck, where participants are leaders of countries who decide whether to shelter migrants or pass them to the next country. We examine the difficulties posed by one-way migration and differences in wealth. We find that leaders sheltered migrants less often when they received them first on a one-way route, compared to when everyone received migrants at the same time. Moreover, the first leader became more likely to shelter migrants when the last country could return them to the first. When one country was wealthier, the wealthy leader sheltered more and the other leaders passed more. We discuss the implications for international cooperation in migrant crises.

15 February 2022 in JAMA Network Open
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LLLianjun Li
Lianjun Li
HZHaiqing Zhao
Haiqing Zhao
NLNoah Lim
Noah Lim
JGJoel Goh
Joel Goh
BNBernard Ng
Bernard Ng
Electronic appointment reminder systems are increasingly being used across health systems in the US and around the world. Their prominence may be associated with their modest (and decreasing) costs of implementation, as well as their association with improvement in patient no-show rates.1-6