Lingyun Ying

Lingyun Ying

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Lingyun Ying

QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QHQinsheng Hou
Qinsheng Hou
WDWenrui Diao
Wenrui Diao
YWYanhao Wang
Yanhao Wang
CMChenglin Mao
Chenglin Mao
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
Android is the most popular smartphone platform with over 85% market share. Its success is built on openness, and phone vendors can utilize the Android source code to make customized products with unique software/hardware features. On the other hand, the fragmentation and customization of Android also bring many security risks that have attracted the attention of researchers. Many efforts were put in to investigate the security of customized Android firmware. However, most of the previous works focus on designing efficient analysis tools or analyzing particular aspects of the firmware. There still lacks a panoramic view of Android firmware ecosystem security and the corresponding understandings based on large-scale firmware datasets. In this work, we made a large-scale comprehensive measurement of the Android firmware ecosystem security. Our study is based on 8,325 firmware images from 153 vendors and 813 Android-related CVEs, which is the largest Android firmware dataset ever used for security measurements. In particular, our study followed a series of research questions, covering vulnerabilities, patches, security updates, and pre-installed apps. To automate the analysis process, we designed a framework, AndScanner+ , to complete firmware crawling, firmware parsing, patch analysis, and app analysis. Through massive data analysis and case explorations, several interesting findings are obtained. For example, the patch delay and missing issues are widespread in Android firmware images, say 31.4% and 5.6% of all images, respectively. The latest images of several phones still contain vulnerable pre-installed apps, and even the corresponding vulnerabilities have been publicly disclosed. In addition to data measurements, we also explore the causes behind these security threats through case studies and demonstrate that the discovered security threats can be converted into exploitable vulnerabilities. There are 46 new vulnerabilities found by AndScanner+ , 36 of which have been assigned CVE/CNVD IDs. This study provides much new knowledge of the Android firmware ecosystem with a deep understanding of software engineering security practices.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZidong Zhang
Zidong Zhang
QHQinsheng Hou
Qinsheng Hou
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
WDWenrui Diao
Wenrui Diao
YGYacong Gu
Yacong Gu
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
Mini-programs are lightweight apps running in super apps (such as WeChat, Baidu, Alipay, and TikTok), an emerging paradigm in the era of mobile computing. With the growing popularity of mini-programs, there is an increasing concern for their security and privacy. In essence, mini-programs are WebView-based apps. This means that they may be vulnerable to the same security risks associated with web apps. In this work, we discovered a new mini-program vulnerability called MiniCPRF (Cross-Page Request Forgery in Mini-Programs). The exploit of this vulnerability is easy, and the attack consequences are severe, leading to unauthorized operations, such as free shopping, and the exposure of confidential information, such as credit card numbers. The root causes of MiniCPRF can be attributed to multiple design flaws in both mini-programs and their super apps, including the insecure routing mechanism, lack of message integrity check, and plain-text storage. To evaluate the impacts of MiniCPRF, we designed an automated analysis framework called MiniCAT. It can automatically crawl mini-programs, perform static analysis on them, and generate detection reports. In large-scale real-world evaluations with MiniCAT, we identified that 32.0% (13,349/41,726) of analyzable mini-programs are potentially vulnerable to MiniCPRF, including some famous ones with millions of users, such as Sohu and Wenjuanxing. Following the responsible disclosure principle, we have reported verified vulnerable mini-programs to the corresponding vendors and developers, and three real-world cases have been confirmed by CNVD. Additionally, we suggest mitigation strategies to resolve the security issue related to MiniCPRF.

5 December 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JYJia Yan
Jia Yan
MWMing Wan
Ming Wan
XJXiangkun Jia
Xiangkun Jia
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
PSPurui Su
Purui Su
ZWZhanyi Wang
Zhanyi Wang
Macro malware has always been a severe threat to cyber security although the Microsoft Office suite applies the default macro-disabling policy. Among the defense solutions at different stages of the attack chain, document analysis is more targeted through detecting malicious documents with macro malware. It is effective, especially with machine learning methods, but still faces problems handling malware variants, supporting file formats, and attack countermeasures with advanced attack techniques (e.g., Excel 4.0 macro and remote template injection). In this paper, we find it promising to detect deceptive information embedded in documents which tricks users into enabling macros instead of detecting file metadata or extracted macro codes. Thus, we propose a novel solution for macro malware detection named DitDetector, which leverages bimodal learning based on deceptive images and text. Specifically, we extract preview images of documents based on an image export SDK of Oracle and extract textual information from preview images based on an open-source OCR engine. The bimodal model of DitDetector contains a visual encoder, a textual encoder, and a forward neural network, which learns based on the joint representation of the two encoders’ outputs. We evaluate DitDetector on three datasets, including an open-source malicious document dataset (i.e., MalDoc) and two collected real-world adversary datasets (i.e., a database of Excel macros and a database of remote template injection samples). Our experiments show that DitDetector outperforms four existing macro code-based machine learning methods and five reputable Anti-Virus engines. Especially in the real-world test of advanced macro malware, DitDetector gets the F1-score of 99.93% which is at least 3.16% higher than compared solutions.

22 April 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HSHequan Shi
Hequan Shi
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
LCLibo Chen
Libo Chen
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
MLMing Liu
Ming Liu
ZXZhi Xue
Zhi Xue

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XLXiaofan Li
Xiaofan Li
YGYacong Gu
Yacong Gu
CQChu Qiao
Chu Qiao
ZZZhenkai Zhang
Zhenkai Zhang
DLDaiping Liu
Daiping Liu
XGXing Gao
Xing Gao
Mainstream Continuous Integration (CI) platforms have provided the plugin functionality to accelerate the development of CI pipelines. Unfortunately, CI plugins, which are essentially reusable code snippets, also expose new attack surfaces as plugins might be developed by less trusted users. In this paper, we present an in-depth study to understand potential security risks in existing CI plugins. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of plugin implementations on four mainstream CI platforms (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, and Azure Pipelines), and investigate several weak links in existing plugin distributions and isolation mechanisms. We investigate seven attack vectors that can enable attackers to hijack plugins and distribute malicious code without plugins users being aware, and further exploit hijacked plugins to manipulate the workflow execution. Additionally, we find that plugin dependency (a plugin references other plugins) might further amplify the attack impact of our disclosed attacks. To evaluate the potential impact, we conduct a large-scale measurement on GitHub and GitLab, covering a total of 1,328,912 repositories using the aforementioned CI platforms. Our measurement results show that a large number of repositories and existing plugins, including many widely used ones, are potentially vulnerable to the proposed attacks. We have duly reported the identified vulnerabilities and received positive responses.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RLRuijie Li
Ruijie Li
CZChenyang Zhang
Chenyang Zhang
HCHuajun Chai
Huajun Chai
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
JTJun Tao
Jun Tao
PowerShell is a powerful and versatile task automation tool. Unfortunately, it is also widely abused by cyber attackers. To bypass malware detection and hinder threat analysis, attackers often employ diverse techniques to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts. Existing deobfuscation tools suffer from the limitation of static analysis, which fails to simulate the real deobfuscation process accurately. Accurate, complete, and robust PowerShell script deobfuscation is still a challenging problem. In this paper, we propose PowerPeeler. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first dynamic PowerShell script deobfuscation approach at the instruction level. It utilizes expression-related Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) nodes to identify potential obfuscated script pieces. Then, PowerPeeler correlates the AST nodes with their corresponding instructions and monitors the script's entire execution process. Subsequently, PowerPeeler dynamically tracks the execution of these instructions and records their execution results. Finally, PowerPeeler stringifies these results to replace the corresponding obfuscated script pieces and reconstruct the deobfuscated script. To evaluate the effectiveness of PowerPeeler, we collect 1,736,669 real-world malicious PowerShell samples and distill two high-quality datasets with diversity obfuscation methods: D-Script with 4,264 obfuscated script files and D-Cmdline with 381 obfuscated samples using PowerShell command-line interface. We compare PowerPeeler with five state-of-the-art deobfuscation tools and GPT-4. The evaluation results demonstrate that PowerPeeler can effectively handle all well-known obfuscation methods. Additionally, the deobfuscation correctness rate of PowerPeeler reaches 95%, significantly surpassing that of other tools. PowerPeeler not only recovers the highest amount of sensitive data (e.g., IPs and URLs) but also maintains a semantic consistency over 97%, which is also the best. Moreover, PowerPeeler effectively obtains the largest quantity of valid deobfuscated results within a limited time frame (i.e., two minutes). Furthermore, PowerPeeler is extendable and can be used as a helpful tool for other cyber security solutions, such as malware analysis and threat intelligence generation.