Rui Chang

Rui Chang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Rui Chang

Zhejiang University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BHBowen He
Bowen He
YCYuan Chen
Yuan Chen
ZCZhuo Chen
Zhuo Chen
XHXiaohui Hu
Xiaohui Hu
YHYufeng Hu
Yufeng Hu
YZYajin Zhou
Yajin Zhou
The prosperity of Ethereum attracts many users to send transactions and trade crypto assets. However, this has also given rise to a new form of transaction-based phishing scam, named TxPhish. Specifically, tempted by high profits, users are tricked into visiting fake websites and signing transactions that enable scammers to steal their crypto assets. The past year has witnessed 11 large-scale TxPhish incidents causing a total loss of more than 70 million. In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study of TxPhish on Ethereum, encompassing the process of a TxPhishTxPhish campaign and details of phishing transactions. To detect TxPhish websites and extract phishing accounts automatically, we present TxPhish, which dynamically visits the suspicious websites, triggers transactions, and simulates results. Between November 25, 2022, and July 31, 2023, we successfully detected and reported 26,333 TxPhish websites and 3,486 phishing accounts. Among all of documented TxPhish websites, 78.9% of them were first reported by us, making TxPhish the largest TxPhish website detection system. Moreover, we provided criminal evidence of four phishing accounts and their fund flow totaling 1.5 million to aid in the recovery of funds for the victims. In addition, we identified bugs in six Ethereum projects and received appreciation.

7 March 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZPZiyue Pan
Ziyue Pan
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
XWXingkai Wang
Xingkai Wang
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
The continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipeline has been widely used and is becoming popular on Internet hosting platforms, such as GitHub. While being popular, however, current CI/CD pipelines suffer from malicious code and severe vulnerabilities. Even worse, it is often under-protected as people have not been fully aware of its attack surfaces and the corresponding impacts. Therefore, in this paper, we conduct a large-scale measurement and a systematic analysis to reveal the attack surfaces of the CI/CD pipeline and quantify their security impacts. Specifically, for the measurement, we collect a data set of 320,000+ CI/CD pipeline-configured GitHub repositories and build an analysis tool to parse the CI/CD pipelines and extract security-critical usages. Our measurement reveals that the script runtimes are prone to code hiding while the script usage update is not in time, giving attackers chances to hide malicious code and exploit existing vulnerabilities. Moreover, even the scripts from verified creators may contain severe vulnerabilities. Besides current CI/CD ecosystem heavily relies on several core scripts, which may lead to a single point of failure. While the CI/CD pipelines contain sensitive information/operations, making them the attacker's favorite targets. Inspired by the measurement findings, we abstract the threat model and the attack approach toward CI/CD pipelines, followed by a systematic analysis of attack surfaces, attack strategies, and the corresponding impacts. We further launch case studies on five attacks in real-world CI/CD environments to validate the revealed attack surfaces. Finally, we give suggestions on mitigating attacks on CI/CD scripts, including securing CI/CD configurations, securing CI/CD scripts, and improving CI/CD infrastructure.

21 December 2023 in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XZXiaoye Zheng
Xiaoye Zheng
ZWZhiyuan Wan
Zhiyuan Wan
YZYun Zhang
Yun Zhang
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
DLDavid Lo
David Lo
Rust is an emerging programming language designed for the development of systems software. To facilitate the reuse of Rust code, crates.io , as a central package registry of the Rust ecosystem, hosts thousands of third-party Rust packages. The openness of crates.io enables the growth of the Rust ecosystem but comes with security risks by severe security advisories. Although Rust guarantees a software program to be safe via programming language features and strict compile-time checking, the unsafe keyword in Rust allows developers to bypass compiler safety checks for certain regions of code. Prior studies empirically investigate the memory safety and concurrency bugs in the Rust ecosystem, as well as the usage of unsafe keywords in practice. Nonetheless, the literature lacks a systematic investigation of the security risks in the Rust ecosystem. In this article, we perform a comprehensive investigation into the security risks present in the Rust ecosystem, asking “what are the characteristics of the vulnerabilities, what are the characteristics of the vulnerable packages, and how are the vulnerabilities fixed in practice?”. To facilitate the study, we first compile a dataset of 433 vulnerabilities, 300 vulnerable code repositories, and 218 vulnerability fix commits in the Rust ecosystem, spanning over 7 years. With the dataset, we characterize the types, life spans, and evolution of the disclosed vulnerabilities. We then characterize the popularity, categorization, and vulnerability density of the vulnerable Rust packages, as well as their versions and code regions affected by the disclosed vulnerabilities. Finally, we characterize the complexity of vulnerability fixes and localities of corresponding code changes, and inspect how practitioners fix vulnerabilities in Rust packages with various localities. We find that memory safety and concurrency issues account for nearly two thirds of the vulnerabilities in the Rust ecosystem. It takes over 2 years for the vulnerabilities to become publicly disclosed, and one-third of the vulnerabilities have no fixes committed before their disclosure. In terms of vulnerability density, we observe a continuous upward trend at the package level over time, but a decreasing trend at the code level since August 2020. In the vulnerable Rust packages, the vulnerable code tends to be localized at the file level, and contains statistically significantly more unsafe functions and blocks than the rest of the code. More popular packages tend to have more vulnerabilities, while the less popular packages suffer from vulnerabilities for more versions. The vulnerability fix commits tend to be localized to a limited number of lines of code. Developers tend to address vulnerable safe functions by adding safe functions or lines to them, vulnerable unsafe blocks by removing them, and vulnerable unsafe functions by modifying unsafe trait implementations. Based on our findings, we discuss implications, provide recommendations for software practitioners, and outline directions for future research.

8 April 2020 in Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ZGZicong Gao
Zicong Gao
WDWeiyu Dong
Weiyu Dong
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
YWYisen Wang
Yisen Wang

25 March 2017 in Cluster Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
LJLiehui Jiang
Liehui Jiang
WCWenzhi Chen
Wenzhi Chen
YXYang Xiang
Yang Xiang
YCYuxia Cheng
Yuxia Cheng
AAAbdulhameed Alelaiwi
Abdulhameed Alelaiwi

24 March 2020 in Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YXYaobin Xie
Yaobin Xie
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
LJLiehui Jiang
Liehui Jiang