Yutian Yang

Yutian Yang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Yutian Yang

College of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 March 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZPZiyue Pan
Ziyue Pan
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
XWXingkai Wang
Xingkai Wang
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
The continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipeline has been widely used and is becoming popular on Internet hosting platforms, such as GitHub. While being popular, however, current CI/CD pipelines suffer from malicious code and severe vulnerabilities. Even worse, it is often under-protected as people have not been fully aware of its attack surfaces and the corresponding impacts. Therefore, in this paper, we conduct a large-scale measurement and a systematic analysis to reveal the attack surfaces of the CI/CD pipeline and quantify their security impacts. Specifically, for the measurement, we collect a data set of 320,000+ CI/CD pipeline-configured GitHub repositories and build an analysis tool to parse the CI/CD pipelines and extract security-critical usages. Our measurement reveals that the script runtimes are prone to code hiding while the script usage update is not in time, giving attackers chances to hide malicious code and exploit existing vulnerabilities. Moreover, even the scripts from verified creators may contain severe vulnerabilities. Besides current CI/CD ecosystem heavily relies on several core scripts, which may lead to a single point of failure. While the CI/CD pipelines contain sensitive information/operations, making them the attacker's favorite targets. Inspired by the measurement findings, we abstract the threat model and the attack approach toward CI/CD pipelines, followed by a systematic analysis of attack surfaces, attack strategies, and the corresponding impacts. We further launch case studies on five attacks in real-world CI/CD environments to validate the revealed attack surfaces. Finally, we give suggestions on mitigating attacks on CI/CD scripts, including securing CI/CD configurations, securing CI/CD scripts, and improving CI/CD infrastructure.

22 May 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
YWYifei Wu
Yifei Wu
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
QLQirui Liu
Qirui Liu
NYNanzi Yang
Nanzi Yang
JMJianfeng Ma
Jianfeng Ma
OS-level virtualization (a.k.a. container) has become a fundamental technology in cloud computing due to the efficiency provided by the shared-kernel design. However, this design results in containers sharing thousands of kernel variables and data structures (termed abstract resources ), which are prevalent but under-protected. Without exploiting other kernel vulnerabilities, a non-privileged container can easily exhaust abstract resources to cause DoS attacks against other containers. Even worse, our experiments demonstrate that abstract resource attacks are a broad class of attacks that affect Linux, FreeBSD, Fuchsia, and all shared-kernel container environments on the top four cloud vendors. To defend against the abstract resource attack, we automatically analyze vulnerable abstract resources in the Linux kernel and detect 501 container-exhaustible resources. To confine these abstract resources dynamically, we propose two new techniques: the flexible in-kernel attachment for flexible resource consumption attachment and the tree-based resource accounting for efficient usage retrieval. Based on these two techniques, we design and implement a fl exible a bstract re s ource confinement framewor k , named Flask, to achieve flexible and efficient abstract resource confinement. Our evaluation shows Flask can efficiently limit abstract resource usage with less than 0.6% performance overhead.

5 December 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
XXXun Xie
Xun Xie
KLKangjie Lu
Kangjie Lu
MWMingsen Wang
Mingsen Wang
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
Linux kernel introduces the memory control group (memcg) to account and confine memory usage at the process-level. Due to its flexibility and efficiency, memcg has been widely adopted by container platforms and has become a fundamental technique. While being critical, memory accounting is prone to missing-account bugs due to the diverse memory accounting interfaces and the massive amount of allocation/free paths. To our knowledge, there is still no systematic analysis against the memory missing-account problem, with respect to its security impacts, detection, etc. In this paper, we present the first systematic study on the memory missing-account problem. We first perform an in-depth analysis of its exploitability and security impacts on container platforms. We then develop a tool named MANTA (short for Memory AccouNTing Analyzer), which combines both static and dynamic analysis techniques to detect and validate memory missing-account bugs automatically. Our analysis shows that all container runtimes, including runC and Kata container, are vulnerable to memory missing-account-based attacks. Moreover, memory missing-account can be exploited to attack the Docker, the CaaS, and the FaaS platforms, leading to memory exhaustion, which crashes individual node or even the whole cluster. Our tool reports 53 exploitable memory missing-account bugs, 37 of which were confirmed by kernel developers with the corresponding patches submitted, and two new CVEs are assigned. Through the in-depth analysis, automated detection, the reported bugs and the submitted patches, we believe our research improves the correctness and security of memory accounting for container platforms.

28 November 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
JTJinjiang Tu
Jinjiang Tu
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
SZSongbo Zhu
Songbo Zhu
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
YZYajin Zhou
Yajin Zhou
Nowadays, code reuse attacks impose a substantial threat to the security of operating system kernels. Control-flow graph-based CFI techniques, while effective, bring considerable performance overhead, thus limiting their practical adoption in real-world products. As an alternative approach, recent research suggests safeguarding the integrity of sensitive pointers as a countermeasure against manipulation attempts. Unfortunately, existing pointer integrity protection schemes only protect sensitive pointers partially and ignore assembly code, leaving protection gaps. To fill up these protection gaps, we propose a novel security concept named full life-cycle integrity , which enforces the integrity of a sensitive pointer at every step on its value flow chain. To realize full life-cycle integrity, we propose three novel techniques, including assembly-aware sensitivity for analyzing assembly code, Merkle PAC tree for protecting interrupt context securely and efficiently, and pointer-grained authentication for defeating spatial substitution attacks. We have developed a practical implementation of comprehensive life-cycle integrity for the Linux kernel, called ”kernel Code Pointer Authentication” (kCPA), which leverages the ARM Pointer Authentication (PAuth) mechanism. This implementation has been extended to the Apple M1 architecture for real-world evaluation on PAuth hardware. Our assessment demonstrates that kCPA effectively mitigates a range of real-world attacks while incurring a minimal 2.5% performance overhead for the Phoronix Test Suite and nearly negligible performance impact for SPEC2017 benchmarks.

14 November 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JZJiaxun Zhu
Jiaxun Zhu
ZCZechao Cai
Zechao Cai
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
RCRui Chang
Rui Chang
Pointer Authentication (PA) was introduced by ARMv8.3 to safeguard the integrity of pointers. While ARM specification allows vendors to implement and customize PA, Apple has tailored it to protect iPhones and Macs with M-series chips on their hardware. Since its debut, Apple PA has been considered to introduce domain isolation to defeat pointer corruption. However, its details have not been publicly disclosed. To shed light on Apple PA customization, this paper first establishes a security model for PA that defines expected properties for cross-domain and intra-domain isolation. We then introduce M1Pecker, a novel analysis framework built upon our Trap-Relay-Based Automated Analysis technique, to evaluate Apple's hardware and software dynamically and automatically against this model. Based on our framework, we perform a comprehensive kernel analysis that combines static and dynamic approaches. We confirm that Apple PA employs multiple diversifiers that robustly satisfy our model's cross-domain isolation property. In contrast, our intra-domain analysis of the XNU kernel identifies violations of intra-domain properties, resulting in four attack surfaces. Apple has fixed these issues in a security update, assigned us a new CVE, and publicly acknowledged our findings.