Konstantinos Adamos

Konstantinos Adamos

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Konstantinos Adamos

University of the Aegean

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 July 2023 in International Journal of Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KAKonstantinos Adamos
Konstantinos Adamos
GSGeorge Stergiopoulos
George Stergiopoulos
MKMichalis Karamousadakis
Michalis Karamousadakis
Dimitris GritzalisDimitris Gritzalis
Dimitris Gritzalis
This paper presents a method that utilizes graph theory and state modelling algorithms to perform automatic complexity analysis of the architecture of cyber-physical systems (CPS). It describes cyber physical systems risk assessment (CPSRA), a tool to provide automatic decision support for enhancing the overall resilience of CPS architectures often used in critical infrastructures. CPRSA is built to enhance industrial risk assessment and improve the resilience of CPS architecture against malicious attacks on the cyber domain that can affect industrial processes, which is critical in a distributed cyber environment. Such attacks often compromise execution states on physical components and lead to hazards or even disasters through plant malfunction. CPSRA is tested against a real-world testbed model of a large SCADA system that is infused with real-world CVE vulnerabilities in some of its components. The tool creates an isomorphic graph of the CPS process model and uses graph algorithms and network analytics on the model to test cyber-attacks and evaluate attack resilience aspects. The tool’s output is then used to pinpoint high-complexity components in terms of influence on the overall CPS architecture and suggest mitigation points for security measure implementation while considering every potential subattack path and subliminal path on the model’s attack graph. The paper complements standardized assessment reports and contributes to automatic architecture assessment for critical infrastructure environments and can be used as the basis to model dependencies and threat propagation in larger digital twins, a need outlined in major NIST publications concerning the security of industrial systems that was previously done manually, without automatic insight into state and vulnerability influences.

1 September 2023 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KAKonstantinos Adamos
Konstantinos Adamos
FFFabio Di Franco
Fabio Di Franco
AGAthanasios Grammatopoulos
Athanasios Grammatopoulos


29 August 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JHJan Hajny
Jan Hajny
MSMarek Sikora
Marek Sikora
KAKonstantinos Adamos
Konstantinos Adamos
FFFabio Di Franco
Fabio Di Franco

29 March 2024 in Computer Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GSGeorge Stergiopoulos
George Stergiopoulos
Panayiotis KotzanikolaouPanayiotis Kotzanikolaou
Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou
KAKonstantinos Adamos
Konstantinos Adamos
LMLilian Mitrou
Lilian Mitrou

19 June 2023 in European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KAKonstantinos Adamos
Konstantinos Adamos
IFIoannis Filippopoulos
Ioannis Filippopoulos
GSGeorge Stergiopoulos
George Stergiopoulos
Dimitris GritzalisDimitris Gritzalis
Dimitris Gritzalis
Operators of Essential services (OESs) and Critical infrastructures (CIs), whether private companies or public organizations are going through a digital transformation to pace with the evolution of technology and to bring better services to customers and countries’ citizens. Operational Technology (OT) systems like Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) used to control and monitor functions in such infrastructures are converging with Information Technology (IT) environments. This convergence has exposed infrastructures to new cyber risks. For this reason, EU Member States have been trying to build resilience against cyber-attacks to ensure the stable operation of their states. Several countries have established cybersecurity incident response procedures as well as steps or phases of response before, during, and after a cyber incident. The sum of these procedures and guidelines constitutes their national cyber emergency plans (NCEPs). Still, these NCEPs differ widely in their approaches. These differences manifest as both managerial, governmental, legal, and technical, creating a complex environment worldwide. In this paper, we gather four major NCEPs worldwide to analyze and compare them with prominent standards and industry guidelines in cybersecurity, like the ISO 27001 and NIST 800 series. We investigate NCEP approaches to building cyber resilience based on their response models, their involved entities, the cooperation between agencies and other countries, and their risk-based categorization for cyber incidents. We elaborate on their differences, potential issues and divergences and argue whether these plans can be combined to bridge potential weaknesses. We selected and surveyed four (4) cyber emergency plans from four (4) countries that are frequent targets of cyber-attacks and have long experience in managing and responding to cyber incidents.