In this paper, a novel mathematical framework is introduced for modeling and analyzing the cyber-physical security of time-critical UAV applications. A general UAV security network interdiction game is formulated to model interactions between a UAV operator and an interdictor, each of which can be benign or malicious. In this game, the interdictor chooses the optimal location(s) from which to target the drone system by interdicting the potential paths of the UAVs. Meanwhile, the UAV operator responds by finding an optimal path selection policy that enables its UAVs to evade attacks and minimize their mission completion time. New notions from cumulative prospect theory (PT) are incorporated into the game to capture the operator’s and the interdictor’s subjective valuations of mission completion times and perceptions of the risk levels facing the UAVs. The equilibrium of the game, with and without PT, is then analytically characterized and studied, while providing detailed derivations of mission completion times (and their expected values), PT valuations of both players (along with proofs of their convergence), and equilibrium points under different studied security regimes. Novel algorithms are then proposed to reach the game’s equilibria under both PT and classical game theory. Simulation results show the properties of the equilibrium for both the rational and PT cases, highlighting the effects of bounded rationality on the interdictor’s and the operator’s strategies as well as mission completion times, and the way it can be exploited by a fully rational opponent.
23 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
This paper proposes five market models for the procurement of flexibility by transmission (TSO) and distribution system operators (DSOs), based on several TSO-DSO coordination schemes, including a disjoint distribution, disjoint transmission, common, fragmented, and multi-level market. The properties of these models are then analyzed. In particular, we prove that the common market is more efficient than the other market models. Then, different methods are proposed to adequately price TSO/DSO interface flows, when procuring cross-grid flexibility. We show that when interface flows are optimally priced, the fragmented and multi-level market solutions converge to those of the common market. To prevent the need for any network information sharing in the coordination schemes, decomposition methods based on bi-level programming and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) are proposed. A developed case study, considering an interconnected transmission-distribution system, corroborates the greater efficiency of the common market, the effect of adequate interface pricing on reducing procurement costs, and the capability of the decomposition methods to reach optimal market solutions with limited information exchange.
24 February 2022 in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
This paper presents a real-word implementation of a TSO-DSO-customer coordination framework for the use of flexibility to support system operation. First, we describe the general requirements for TSO-DSO-customer coordination, including potential coordination schemes, actors and roles and the required architecture. Then, we particularise those general requirements for a real-world demonstration in Sweden, aiming to avoid congestions in the grid during the high-demand winter season. In the light of current congestion management rules and existing markets in Sweden, we describe an integration path to newly defined flexibility markets in support of new tools that we developed for this application. The results show that the use of flexibility can reduce the congestion costs while enhancing the secure operation of the system. Additionally, we discuss challenges and lessons learned from the demonstration, including the importance of the engagement between stakeholders, the role of availability remuneration, and the paramount importance of defining appropriate technical requirements and market timings.
In this paper, a transmission-distribution systems flexibility market is introduced, in which system operators (SOs) jointly procure flexibility from different systems to meet their needs (balancing and congestion management) using a common market. This common market is, then, formulated as a cooperative game aiming at identifying a stable and efficient split of costs of the jointly procured flexibility among the participating SOs to incentivize their cooperation. The non-emptiness of the core of this game is then mathematically proven, implying the stability of the game and the naturally-arising incentive for cooperation among the SOs. Several cost allocation mechanisms are then introduced, while characterizing their mathematical properties. A case study is then presented, considering an interconnected system composed of the IEEE 14-bus transmission system and the Matpower 18-bus, 69-bus, and 141-bus distributions systems. The numerical results showcase the cooperation-induced reduction in system-wide flexibility procurement costs, and identify the varying costs borne by the different SOs under different cost allocations methods.
In this paper, a novel anti-jamming mechanism is proposed to analyze and enhance the security of adversarial Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) systems. In particular, the problem is formulated as a dynamic psychological game between a soldier and an attacker. In this game, the soldier seeks to accomplish a time-critical mission by traversing a battlefield within a certain amount of time, while maintaining its connectivity with an IoBT network. The attacker, on the other hand, seeks to find the optimal opportunity to compromise the IoBT network and maximize the delay of the soldier’s IoBT transmission link. The soldier and the attacker’s psychological behavior are captured using tools from psychological game theory, with which the soldier’s and attacker’s intentions to harm one another are considered in their utilities. To solve this game, a novel learning algorithm based on Bayesian updating is proposed to find a -like psychological self-confirming equilibrium of the game.