Background/problem: Community forest management depends on institutional arrangements that shape participation, incentives, and long-term stewardship. In Vietnam, community forest allocation and forest protection contracting create contrasting governance conditions. Objective/purpose: The qualitative objective was to examine how tenure, decision authority, incentives, benefit sharing, and participation differed across the two arrangements. The quantitative objective was to assess household perceptions of protection and long-term forest-development activities under forest protection contracting. Design and Methodology: An exploratory sequential mixed methods comparative case-study design was used. Phase 1 comprised field observations, six focus group discussions, and eight key informant interviews. Findings informed Phase 2, a survey of 89 respondents using nine Likert-type perception items. The strands were integrated through a joint display based on Ostrom’s common-pool resource principles and adaptive co-management. Results: Community forest allocation cases showed more secure rights, greater local decision authority, and broader long-term management activities, whereas forest protection contracting concentrated participation on assigned protection duties. Quantitatively, 93% of respondents disagreed that patrols were insufficient, 91% disagreed that illegal exploitation had increased, and 89% agreed that no forest-enrichment activities had been undertaken. Household economic status differed between communes, p < .001. Integrated findings converged on a distinction between favorable perceptions of routine protection and limited long-term forest development under short-term contracting. Conclusion and Implications: More secure rights, meaningful local decision-making, equitable benefits, and expectations of future gains were associated with stronger conditions for long-term stewardship. Policies should combine protection incentives with inclusive participation, longer-term rights, and local decision authority.