1 May 2019 in Mathematics of Operations Research
We study a multiperiod network revenue management problem where a seller sells multiple products made from multiple resources with finite capacity in an environment where the underlying demand function is a priori unknown (in the nonparametric sense). The objective of the seller is to simultaneously learn the unknown demand function and dynamically price the products to minimize the expected revenue loss. For the problem where the number of selling periods and initial capacity are scaled by [ ], it is known that the expected revenue loss of any non-anticipating pricing policy is [ ]. However, there is a considerable gap between this theoretical lower bound and the performance bound of the best-known heuristic control in the literature. In this paper, we propose a nonparametric self-adjusting control and show that its expected revenue loss is [ ] for any arbitrarily small [ ], provided that the underlying demand function is sufficiently smooth. This is the tightest bound of its kind for the problem setting that we consider in this paper, and it significantly improves the performance bound of existing heuristic controls in the literature. In addition, our intermediate results on the large deviation bounds for spline estimation and nonparametric stability analysis of constrained optimization are of independent interest and are potentially useful for other applications. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0937 .
1 September 2024 in Operations Research
In “Real-Time Spatial–Intertemporal Pricing and Relocation in a Ride-Hailing Network: Near-Optimal Policies and The Value of Dynamic Pricing,” Chen, Lei, and Jasin consider a dynamic pricing problem faced by a ride-hailing service provider who manages a fixed number of servers and serves price-sensitive customers within a network. Servers serve arriving customers by relocating from the requested origins to destinations within a certain travel time. The authors first propose a static pricing policy based on the optimal solution to a deterministic relaxation of the original stochastic problem. They show that the proposed static policy matches the best possible asymptotic performance of any static policy. The authors further propose a dynamic pricing policy that adaptively changes the prices in a way that reduces the impact of past demand randomness on the balance of future distributions of servers and customers across the network. They show that the dynamic pricing policy achieves significantly better asymptotical performance. The proposed policies and their performance guarantees are further extended to a case where the firm jointly decides the relocation of vacant servers
1 March 2021 in Operations Research
Dynamic Pricing with Limited Resource and Unknown Demand Parameters
1 May 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
We investigate when a buyer seeking to procure multiple units of an input may find it advantageous to run a “test auction” in which she has incumbent suppliers bid on a portion of the desired units. The test auction reveals incumbent supplier cost information that helps the buyer determine how many entrants (if any) to recruit at a cost prior to awarding the remaining units. The optimal number of entrant suppliers to recruit follows a threshold policy that is monotonic in the test auction’s clearing price unless the underlying supplier cost distribution is not regular. When setting her reserve price in the test auction, the buyer uses supplier recruitment as her “outside option”: if the reserve price is not met in the test auction, the buyer recruits new suppliers and runs a second auction. We compare the attractiveness of the test auction procedure relative to the more conventional procedure in which the buyer auctions off her entire demand in one auction. Since the buyer can choose ex ante which procedure to use, we propose using whichever has lower ex ante total (purchase plus recruitment) cost. Finally, using an optimal mechanism analysis, we find a lower bound on the buyer’s cost, and use that cost as a benchmark to show that our proposed sourcing strategy performs well given its ease of implementation. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0636 .
1 November 2021 in Operations Research
Designing Open-bid Procurement Auction with Supplier Qualification Screenings Manufacturers often use re-sourcing initiatives to keep their suppliers’ pricing competitive; e.g., new entrant suppliers are identified and invited to compete with the incumbent supplier for supply contracts in an open-bid auction. To ensure that entrant suppliers have the capability of executing the contract, the conventional approach for many manufacturers is to conduct qualification screenings on all the entrants prior to auction bidding and only allow qualified entrant suppliers to compete in the auction. In “‘Now or Later?’ When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing”, Zhang, Chen, and Katok explore an alternative arrangement of this process where all entrant suppliers are invited for bidding first before qualification screenings are selectively conducted afterward to determine the contract winner. This new approach helps reduce the waste of manufacturers’ screening efforts on suppliers with uncompetitive bids but in the meantime introduces incentives for less competitive supplier bidding behavior. They provide analytical and numerical evidence that this new approach could be very effective in managing manufacturers’ procurement costs.
1 November 2022 in Operations Research
Integrating Cost Reduction and Supplier Selection Activities Manufacturers who outsource production may find ways to reduce suppliers’ cost to lower the contract price. Conventionally, this is done after supplier selection. However, in practice, a sizable portion of the degree to which the manufacturer can help a supplier reduce cost could be learned before the supplier starts production. This opens up a possibility to better integrate supplier selection and cost-reduction activities. In “Procurement Mechanisms with Postauction Preaward Cost-Reduction Investigations,” Chen, Beil, and Duenyas explore an alternative procurement process wherein, after suppliers’ initial pricing bids are collected, the manufacturer investigates suppliers’ cost-saving potential and then leverages this information to select the contract winner. They provide analytical and numerical evidence that this integrated procurement process not only helps the manufacturers reduce cost significantly, but also benefits the suppliers in many plausible scenarios.