Kihong Son

Dr. Kihong Son

Medical Information Research Section, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SJSeokhwan Jang
Seokhwan Jang
SKSeungeon Kim
Seungeon Kim
MKMina Kim
Mina Kim
KSKihong Son
Kihong Son
KLKyoung-Yong Lee
Kyoung-Yong Lee
JRJong Beom Ra
Jong Beom Ra
Head motion may unexpectedly occur during a CT scan. It thereby results in motion artifacts in a reconstructed image and may lead to a false diagnosis or a failure of diagnosis. To alleviate this motion problem, as a hardware approach, increasing the gantry rotation speed or using an immobilization device is usually considered. These approaches, however, cannot completely resolve the motion problem. Hence, motion estimation (ME) and compensation for it have been explored as a software approach instead. In this paper, adopting the latter approach, we propose a head motion correction algorithm in helical CT scanning, based on filtered backprojection (FBP). For the motion correction, we first introduce a new motion-compensated (MC) reconstruction scheme based on FBP, which is applicable to helical scanning. We then estimate the head motion parameters by using an iterative nonlinear optimization algorithm, or the L-BFGS. Note here that an objective function for the optimization is defined on reconstructed images in each iteration, which are obtained by using the proposed MC reconstruction scheme. Using the estimated motion parameters, we then obtain the final MC reconstructed image. Using numerical and physical phantom datasets along with simulated head motions, we demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can provide significantly improved quality to MC reconstructed images by alleviating motion artifacts.


27 November 2022 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KSKihong Son
Kihong Son
DKDaehong Kim
Daehong Kim
SLSooyeul Lee
Sooyeul Lee
The photon counting detector (PCD) in computed tomography (CT) can count the number of incoming photons in order to obtain energy information for photons corresponding to user-defined thresholds. Research on the extraction of effective atomic number (EAN) and relative electron density (RED) using dual-energy CT (DECT) is currently underway. This study proposes a method for improving EAN and RED accuracy of tissue-equivalent materials by using PCD-CT-based stoichiometric calibration. After obtaining DECT images in energy bin (EB) and full spectrum (FS) modes for eight tissue-equivalent materials, the EAN was calculated with stoichiometric calibration. Using the EAN image, the RED image was acquired to evaluate the accuracy. The errors of both EAN and RED obtained with EB were within 4%. In particular, the accuracy of RED was higher than that of the FS method. Study results indicate that PCD-CT contributes to improving EAN and RED accuracy. Further studies will be aimed at reducing ring artifacts by pixel-correcting PCD images and improving stopping power ratio (SPR) measurements for dose calculation in particle therapy.

26 May 2023 in Diagnostics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PJPil-Hyun Jeon
Pil-Hyun Jeon
SJSang-Hyun Jeon
Sang-Hyun Jeon
DKDonghee Ko
Donghee Ko
GAGiyong An
Giyong An
HSHackjoon Shim
Hackjoon Shim
MCMyung-Ae Chung
Myung-Ae Chung
Background: In coronary computed tomography angiography (CCTA), the main issue of image quality is noise in obese patients, blooming artifacts due to calcium and stents, high-risk coronary plaques, and radiation exposure to patients. Objective: To compare the CCTA image quality of deep learning-based reconstruction (DLR) with that of filtered back projection (FBP) and iterative reconstruction (IR). Methods: This was a phantom study of 90 patients who underwent CCTA. CCTA images were acquired using FBP, IR, and DLR. In the phantom study, the aortic root and the left main coronary artery in the chest phantom were simulated using a needleless syringe. The patients were classified into three groups according to their body mass index. Noise, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and the contrast-to-noise ratio (CNR) were measured for image quantification. A subjective analysis was also performed for FBP, IR, and DLR. Results: According to the phantom study, DLR reduced noise by 59.8% compared to FBP and increased SNR and CNR by 121.4% and 123.6%, respectively. In a patient study, DLR reduced noise compared to FBP and IR. Furthermore, DLR increased the SNR and CNR more than FBP and IR. In terms of subjective scores, DLR was higher than FBP and IR. Conclusion: In both phantom and patient studies, DLR effectively reduced image noise and improved SNR and CNR. Therefore, the DLR may be useful for CCTA examinations.

7 March 2026 in JMIR Preprints
Verified
Preprint
Open access
SJSaera Jung
Saera Jung
KSKihong Son
Kihong Son
BACKGROUND Software-based and artificial intelligence (AI)–enabled medical devices are increasingly networked and updateable, expanding the attack surface and making cybersecurity governance intersect with quality management and postmarket oversight. Yet regulated device risk management remains primarily oriented toward patient-safety harms under ISO 14971–style frameworks. OBJECTIVE To compare how Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS), the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the European Union/Medical Device Coordination Group (EU/MDCG) define and operationalize cybersecurity for medical device software across premarket review and postmarket surveillance, and to identify informatics-relevant gaps between safety vigilance and vulnerability-focused cybersecurity practice. METHODS We conducted a qualitative comparative document analysis of publicly available laws, regulations, guidance, and standards relevant to medical device cybersecurity and AI-enabled software. Using a common analytic framework, we mapped (1) conceptual scope (definitions and lifecycle boundaries), (2) premarket operationalization (required artifacts and evidence such as threat modeling, software bills of materials, and vulnerability management plans), and (3) postmarket operationalization (monitoring, reporting, and update governance). RESULTS We analyzed 10 jurisdiction-specific regulatory and guidance documents (MFDS: 2; FDA: 4; EU/MDCG: 4) and mapped requirements into three domains (conceptual scope, premarket operationalization, and postmarket operationalization) across the total product life cycle. Across jurisdictions, cybersecurity converged on protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and device functions but was embedded in different regulatory architectures. MFDS emphasized documentation completeness aligned with ISO 14971 risk management; the FDA framed cybersecurity as quality-system and design-control activities spanning the total product life cycle, including statutory requirements for “cyber devices”; and the EU treated cybersecurity as an extension of safety under MDR/IVDR interpreted through MDCG guidance, with additional cross-sector obligations for subsets of manufacturers and service providers. A common limitation was that vigilance pathways were largely triggered by patient-harm thresholds, whereas vulnerabilities and near-miss security events were often managed through parallel information-security processes. CONCLUSIONS Regulatory approaches show definitional alignment but operational fragmentation at the interface between patient-safety vigilance and vulnerability-centric cybersecurity practice. Integrating cybersecurity as an interoperable process within the quality management system—linking vulnerability monitoring, incident response, and software update controls to CAPA and change control—and expanding postmarket surveillance to incorporate vulnerability and performance signals may support more trustworthy deployment of regulated AI-enabled medical software.

30 July 2026 in JMIR Medical Informatics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SJSaera Jung
Saera Jung
KSKihong Son
Kihong Son
Background: Software-based and AI-enabled medical devices are increasingly networked and updatable, expanding the attack surface and making cybersecurity governance intersect with quality management and postmarket oversight. Regulated device risk management nevertheless remains primarily oriented toward patient-safety harms under ISO 14971 frameworks, which may not fully capture cybersecurity risks affecting data integrity, system resilience, or service continuity. Objective: This study aimed to compare how Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS), the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the European Union/Medical Device Coordination Group (EU/MDCG) define and operationalize cybersecurity for medical device software across premarket review and postmarket surveillance, and to identify informatics-relevant gaps between safety vigilance and vulnerability-focused cybersecurity practice. Methods: We conducted a qualitative comparative document analysis of 10 jurisdiction-specific regulatory and guidance documents (MFDS: n=2, FDA: n=4, and EU/MDCG: n=4), supplemented by cross-sectoral instruments and peer-reviewed literature. Using a common analytic framework informed by functional comparative legal analysis, we mapped (1) conceptual scope (definitions and life cycle boundaries), (2) premarket operationalization (required artifacts and evidence such as threat modeling, software bills of materials, and vulnerability management plans), and (3) postmarket operationalization (monitoring, reporting, and update governance). Results: Of the 10 documents analyzed (MFDS: n=2, FDA: n=4, and EU/MDCG: n=4), all 3 jurisdictions converged on protecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and device functions but embedded these expectations in different regulatory architectures. MFDS emphasized documentation completeness aligned with ISO 14971 risk management; the FDA framed cybersecurity as quality-system and design-control activities spanning the total product life cycle, including statutory requirements for “cyber devices” under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act section 524B; and the European Union treated cybersecurity as an extension of safety under the Medical Device Regulation (MDR) and In Vitro Diagnostic Regulation (IVDR), interpreted through MDCG guidance, with additional cross-sector obligations from the Network and Information Security 2 (NIS2) Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). A common limitation was that vigilance pathways were largely triggered by patient-harm thresholds, whereas vulnerabilities and near-miss security events were often managed through parallel information-security processes. Mapping to ISO 13485 Clauses 7.3 and 8 indicated that integration of cybersecurity controls into existing quality management system (QMS) processes is feasible but not consistently mandated. Conclusions: Across the 3 jurisdictions examined in this study, regulatory approaches to medical device cybersecurity show definitional alignment but operational fragmentation at the interface between patient-safety vigilance and vulnerability-centric cybersecurity practice. Within the limits of this document-based analysis, the findings suggest that integrating cybersecurity as an interoperable process within the QMS—linking vulnerability monitoring, incident response, and software update controls to corrective and preventive action (CAPA) and change control—and expanding postmarket surveillance to incorporate vulnerability and performance signals could support more trustworthy deployment of regulated AI-enabled medical software.