With high penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), power systems are increasingly transforming into distributed power grids, which provide grid automation, decarbonization, and decentralization of critical assets. Smart inverters are key power-electronic devices that connect renewable energy and energy storage equipment to power grids. DER includes several intelligent grid functions, such as fault ride through, grid-voltage support, and reactive-power compensation, typically with real-time remote access, data exchange, and seamless over-the-air firmware updates in a cyber-physical environment. However, cybersecurity concerns arise due to extensive information exchange among DER and multiple stakeholders (e.g., utilities, aggregators, vendors, operators, and owners). Therefore, smart inverters account for a growing attack surface for the power grid. This article reviews the cybersecurity best practices and current recommendations for smart inverters and explores emerging cyber threats for smart inverters, including malware attacks and hardware attacks. Finally, we propose a new smart inverter security and resilience framework for developing cyber-resilient smart inverters against the advanced/future threat actors. This article establishes a resilience-by-design baseline reference for smart inverter cybersecurity teams, which bridges the gap between cybersecurity and power-electronics’ communities.
30 January 2025 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Critical infrastructures like the power grid are at risk from increasing cyber threats due to high penetration of interconnected distributed energy resources (DER). Compromised DER endpoints can cause events, data breaches, communication loss, intentional device failures, and even cascading outages. To address these challenges, this paper explores cybersecurity issues in DER management systems (DERMS), including state-of-the-art reviews on architectures, communication protocols, access control privileges, data breaches, identity management policies, attacks such as false data injection, denial of service, distributed denial of service, malware, threats affecting data integrity, and network vulnerabilities. Realistic threat scenarios are outlined, followed by discussions on futuristic solutions like the zero trust framework. The paper presents new architectural patterns for recently released multi-level hierarchical framework as per IEEE 1547.3 standard to handle DERMS data and assets. The paper also discusses potential threats compromising the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, and Accountability (CIAA) properties at each level of the IEEE 1547.3 framework. This review is unique and comprehensive, as it covers existing research on cybersecurity challenges in DER-related assets and outlines the necessary capabilities to equip Intrusion Diagnostic Units (IDUs) in future DERMS technologies, all while ensuring compliance with IEEE 1547.3 standard requirements.
This paper presents the Archimedes optimization algorithm to eliminate selective harmonics in a cascaded H-bridge (CHB) multilevel inverter (MLI). The foremost objective of the selective harmonic elimination (SHE) is to eliminate lower order harmonics by finding the optimal switching angle combination which minimizes the objective function containing Total Harmonic Distortion (THD) and other specific harmonic terms. Consequently, the THD is also reduced. In this study, a recently proposed metaheuristic technique named the Archimedes optimization algorithm (AOA) is used to determine the optimal angles corresponding to the 5, 7 and 9 level CHB-MLI. AOA involves equations related to a physical law, the Archimedes Principle. It is based on the idea of a buoyant force acting upward on a body or object that is partially or completely submerged in a fluid, and the upward force is related to the weight of the fluid displaced. This optimization technique has been implemented on CHB-MLI to generate various level outputs, simulated on MATLAB™ R2021a version environment software. The simulation results reveal that AOA is a high-performance optimization technique in terms of convergence speed and exploitation-exploration balance and is well-suited to the solution of the SHE problem. Furthermore, the laboratory validated the simulation result on a hardware setup using DSP-TMS320F28379D.
Cybersecurity of power electronics (PE) is increasingly essential as more systems from renewable energy systems, energy storage systems, and electric vehicle charging stations utilize PE devices to connect them into power grids with complex communication and computation systems for advanced control and situational awareness improvement in smart grid environments. However, cybersecurity research and development (R&D) of networked power electronics (PE) is hampered by the lack of real-time security testbed incorporating real cyber events. This paper proposes a real-time hardware-in-the-loop cybersecurity tested for PE systems in cyber-physical environments. The proposed security testbed consists of: 1) a real-time PE system simulator; 2) a real-time cyber system using real network systems and a server; and 3) penetration testing tools generating real Cyber-attacks as cyber events. Several real cyber-attacks are created and their impacts in a PE system are provided to validate the feasibility of the proposed security testbed.
1 June 2019 in Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering
Grid resilience has become a paramount concern in today’s dynamic energy landscape, wherein the mass integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) plays a crucial role in achieving flexible and resilient power grids. A DER management system (DERMS) is a remote monitoring and control system managing DERs in a distribution system, which is becoming increasingly important for a DER-rich power grid. However, an outstanding issue is a single point of failure of the centralized DERMS by cyberattacks, which threatens grid stability and results in regional power outages in the worst case. This paper proposes a novel approach to address the resilience challenges faced in the centralized DERMS through the development of a blockchain (BC)-assisted resilient control mechanism. The main idea is to create a virtual DERMS monitoring and control using BC smart contract and network that takes over seamlessly in the event of a failure of the DERMS. This BC system enables securely sharing DER and grid data among BC clients and provides control commands to DERs when the DERMS is a denial-of-service condition. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed BC-assisted DERMS, voltage and frequency control recovery cases are tested in a real-time hardware-in-the-loop DER system testbed.