Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are an integral part of modern society and are used in various industries, providing users with positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). However, their effectiveness is vulnerable to signal interference, since GNSSs are based on received satellite signals from space, and that can severely impact applications that rely on continuous and accurate data. Interference can pose significant risks to sectors dependent on GNSSs, including transportation, telecommunications, finance, geodesy, and others. For this reason, in parallel with the development of GNSSs, various interference protection techniques are being developed to enable users to receive GNSS signals without the risk of interference, which can cause various effects, such as reducing the accuracy of positioning, as well as completely blocking signal reception and making it impossible to obtain positioning. There are various sources and methods of interfering with GNSS signals, and the greatest consequences are caused by intentional interference, which includes jamming, spoofing, and meaconing. This study investigates the effects of jamming devices on static GNSS observations using high-accuracy devices through multiple controlled experiments using both single-frequency (SF) and multi-frequency (MF) jammers. The aim was to identify the distances within which signal interference devices disrupt GNSS signal reception and position accuracy. The research conducted herein was divided into several phases where zones within which the jammer completely blocked the reception of the GNSS signal were determined (blackout zones), as were zones within which it was possible to obtain the position (but the influence of the jammer was present) and the influence of the jammer from different directions/azimuths in relation to the GNSS receiver. Various statistical indicators of the jammer’s influence, such as DOP (dilution of precision), SNR (signal-to-noise-ratio), RMS (root mean square), and others, were obtained through research. The results of this study indicate that commercially available, low-cost jamming devices, when operated within manufacturer-specified distances, completely disrupt the reception of GNSS signals. Their impact is also evident at greater distances, where they significantly reduce SNR values, increase DOP, and decrease the number of visible satellites, leading to reduced measurement reliability and integrity. These results underline the necessity of developing effective protection mechanisms against GNSS interference and strategies to ensure reliable signal reception in GNSS-dependent applications, particularly as the use of jamming devices becomes more prevalent.

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CROPOS, as the Croatian GNSS network, was modernized and upgraded to support the Galileo system in 2019. Two of CROPOS’s services—VPPS (Network RTK service) and GPPS (post-processing service)—were assessed for the contribution of the Galileo system to their performance. A station used for field testing was previously examined and surveyed to determine the local horizon and to carry out a detailed mission planning. The whole day of observation was divided into several sessions, each with a different visibility of Galileo satellites. A special observation sequence was designed: VPPS (GPS-GLO-GAL), VPPS (GAL-only), and GPPS (GPS-GLO-GAL-BDS). All observations were taken on the same station with the same GNSS receiver, Trimble R12. Each static observation session was post-processed in Trimble Business Center (TBC) in two different ways: considering all available systems (GGGB) and considering GAL-only observations. A daily static solution based on all systems (GGGB) was considered as the reference for the accuracy assessment of all obtained solutions. The results obtained with VPPS (GPS-GLO-GAL) and VPPS (GAL-only) were analyzed and assessed; the results obtained with GAL-only have shown a slightly higher scatter. It was concluded that the inclusion of the Galileo system in CROPOS has contributed to the availability and reliability of solutions but not to their accuracy. By complying with the observation rules and taking redundant measurements, the accuracy of GAL-only results can be improved.

The paper analyzes the geodynamic network of the City of Zagreb for periodic campaigns carried out from 2006 to 2009 which were processed by different software packages. The first computations and processing results were obtained by...