Sophie Gryseels

Dr. Sophie Gryseels

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 June 2015 in Nature
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Journal Article
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MCMiles W. Carroll
Miles W. Carroll
DMDavid A. Matthews
David A. Matthews
JHJulian Hiscox
Julian Hiscox
MEMichael J. Elmore
Michael J. Elmore
GPGeorgios Pollakis
Georgios Pollakis
SGStephan Günther
Stephan Günther
Analysis of 179 new Ebola virus sequences from patient samples collected in Guinea between March 2014 and January 2015 shows how different lineages evolved and spread in West Africa. Miles Carroll and colleagues report describe the genetic evolution of Ebola virus circulating in West Africa, based on 179 new virus sequences from patient samples collected in Guinea between March 2014 and January 2015. Their analysis shows how different lineages evolved and spread in West Africa between Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. West Africa is currently witnessing the most extensive Ebola virus (EBOV) outbreak so far recorded1,2,3. Until now, there have been 27,013 reported cases and 11,134 deaths. The origin of the virus is thought to have been a zoonotic transmission from a bat to a two-year-old boy in December 2013 (ref. 2). From this index case the virus was spread by human-to-human contact throughout Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, the origin of the particular virus in each country and time of transmission is not known and currently relies on epidemiological analysis, which may be unreliable owing to the difficulties of obtaining patient information. Here we trace the genetic evolution of EBOV in the current outbreak that has resulted in multiple lineages. Deep sequencing of 179 patient samples processed by the European Mobile Laboratory, the first diagnostics unit to be deployed to the epicentre of the outbreak in Guinea, reveals an epidemiological and evolutionary history of the epidemic from March 2014 to January 2015. Analysis of EBOV genome evolution has also benefited from a similar sequencing effort of patient samples from Sierra Leone. Our results confirm that the EBOV from Guinea moved into Sierra Leone, most likely in April or early May. The viruses of the Guinea/Sierra Leone lineage mixed around June/July 2014. Viral sequences covering August, September and October 2014 indicate that this lineage evolved independently within Guinea. These data can be used in conjunction with epidemiological information to test retrospectively the effectiveness of control measures, and provides an unprecedented window into the evolution of an ongoing viral haemorrhagic fever outbreak.

6 October 2020 in Mammal Review
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Journal Article
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SGSophie Gryseels
Sophie Gryseels
LBLuc De Bruyn
Luc De Bruyn
RGRalf Gyselings
Ralf Gyselings
SCSebastien Calvignac-Spencer
Sebastien Calvignac-Spencer
FLFabian H. Leendertz
Fabian H. Leendertz
HLHerwig Leirs
Herwig Leirs
It has been a long time since the world has experienced a pandemic with such a rapid devastating impact as the current COVID‐19 pandemic. The causative agent, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), is unusual in that it appears capable of infecting many different mammal species. As a significant proportion of people worldwide are infected with SARS‐CoV‐2 and may spread the infection unknowingly before symptoms occur or without any symptoms ever occurring, there is a non‐negligible risk of humans spreading SARS‐CoV‐2 to wildlife, in particular to wild non‐human mammals. Because of SARS‐CoV‐2’s apparent evolutionary origins in bats and reports of humans transmitting the virus to pets and zoo animals, regulations for the prevention of human‐to‐animal transmission have so far focused mostly on these animal groups. We summarise recent studies and reports that show that a wide range of distantly related mammals are likely to be susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2, and that susceptibility or resistance to the virus is, in general, not predictable, or only predictable to some extent, from phylogenetic proximity to known susceptible or resistant hosts. In the absence of solid evidence on the susceptibility and resistance to SARS‐CoV‐2 for each of the >6500 mammal species, we argue that sanitary precautions should be taken by humans interacting with any other mammal species in the wild. Preventing human‐to‐wildlife SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission is important to protect these animals (some of which are classed as threatened) from disease, but also to avoid establishment of novel SARS‐CoV‐2 reservoirs in wild mammals. The risk of repeated re‐infection of humans from such a wildlife reservoir could severely hamper SARS‐CoV‐2 control efforts. Activities during which direct or indirect interaction with wild mammals may occur include wildlife research, conservation activities, forestry work, pest control, management of feral populations, ecological consultancy work, management of protected areas and natural environments, wildlife tourism and wildlife rehabilitation in animal shelters. During such activities, we recommend sanitary precautions, such as physical distancing, wearing face masks and gloves, and frequent decontamination, which are very similar to regulations currently imposed to prevent transmission among humans. We further recommend active surveillance of domestic and feral animals that could act as SARS‐CoV‐2 intermediate hosts between humans and wild mammals.

11 January 2017 in PLOS Pathogens
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Journal Article
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SGSophie Gryseels
Sophie Gryseels
SBStuart J. E. Baird
Stuart J. E. Baird
BBBenny Borremans
Benny Borremans
RMRhodes H Makundi
Rhodes H Makundi
HLHerwig Leirs
Herwig Leirs
JBJoëlle Goüy de Bellocq
Joëlle Goüy de Bellocq
Many emerging infections are RNA virus spillovers from animal reservoirs. Reservoir identification is necessary for predicting the geographic extent of infection risk, but rarely are taxonomic levels below the animal species considered as reservoir, and only key circumstances in nature and methodology allow intrinsic virus-host associations to be distinguished from simple geographic (co-)isolation. We sampled and genetically characterized in detail a contact zone of two subtaxa of the rodent Mastomys natalensis in Tanzania. We find two distinct arenaviruses, Gairo and Morogoro virus, each spatially confined to a single M. natalensis subtaxon, only co-occurring at the contact zone’s centre. Inter-subtaxon hybridization at this centre and a continuum of quality habitat for M. natalensis show that both viruses have the ecological opportunity to spread into the other substaxon’s range, but do not, strongly suggesting host-intrinsic barriers. Such barriers could explain why human cases of another M. natalensis-borne arenavirus, Lassa virus, are limited to West Africa. Reservoirs of zoonotic viruses are usually equated with a particular wildlife species. It is rarely assessed whether genetic groups below the species level may instead represent the actual reservoir, though this would have major implications on estimations of the zoonosis’ spatial distribution. Here we investigate whether geographically and genetically distinct subtaxa of the widespread African rodent Mastomys natalensis carry distinct arenaviruses, by sampling in detail across a contact zone of two of these subtaxa. Ongoing hybridization shows that individuals of the subtaxa are in direct physical contact, in principle allowing viral exchange, yet neither of the two arenaviruses -Gairo and Morogoro virus- were found to have crossed the zone. Such intraspecific genetic barriers to arenavirus spatial spread have important implications for our understanding of the related Lassa arenavirus, a pathogen potentially lethal to humans of which Mastomys natalensis is also the main reservoir. Although Lassa virus appears to infect several secondary hosts, its distribution is restricted to West Africa and matches that of another M. natalensis subtaxon. Our data thus indicates that it is because of M. natalensis intraspecific distinctions that the human Lassa fever endemic area has not expanded to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.

29 May 2015 in Scientific Reports
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BBBenny Borremans
Benny Borremans
RVRaphaël Vossen
Raphaël Vossen
BBBeate Becker-Ziaja
Beate Becker-Ziaja
SGSophie Gryseels
Sophie Gryseels
NHNelika Hughes
Nelika Hughes
HLHerwig Leirs
Herwig Leirs
Arenaviruses can cause mild to severe hemorrhagic fevers. Humans mainly get infected through contact with infected rodents or their excretions, yet little is known about transmission dynamics within rodent populations. Morogoro virus (MORV) is an Old World arenavirus closely related to Lassa virus with which it shares the same host species Mastomys natalensis. We injected MORV in its host and sampled blood and excretions at frequent intervals. Infection in adults was acute; viral RNA disappeared from blood after 18 days post infection (dpi) and from excretions after 39 dpi. Antibodies were present from 7 dpi and never disappeared. Neonatally infected animals acquired a chronic infection with RNA and antibodies in blood for at least 3 months. The quantified excretion and antibody patterns can be used to inform mathematical transmission models and are essential for understanding and controlling transmission in the natural rodent host populations.

7 August 2012 in PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases
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Journal Article
Open access
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SGSophie Gryseels
Sophie Gryseels
DADiana Amissah
Diana Amissah
LDLies Durnez
Lies Durnez
KVKoen Vandelannoote
Koen Vandelannoote
HLHerwig Leirs
Herwig Leirs
MEMiriam Eddyani
Miriam Eddyani
The reservoir and mode of transmission of Mycobacterium ulcerans, the causative agent of Buruli ulcer, remain unknown. Ecological, genetic and epidemiological information nonetheless suggests that M. ulcerans may reside in aquatic protozoa. We experimentally infected Acanthamoeba polyphaga with M. ulcerans and found that the bacilli were phagocytised, not digested and remained viable for the duration of the experiment. Furthermore, we collected 13 water, 90 biofilm and 45 detritus samples in both Buruli ulcer endemic and non-endemic communities in Ghana, from which we cultivated amoeboid protozoa and mycobacteria. M. ulcerans was not isolated, but other mycobacteria were as frequently isolated from intracellular as from extracellular sources, suggesting that they commonly infect amoebae in nature. We screened the samples as well as the amoeba cultures for the M. ulcerans markers IS2404, IS2606 and KR-B. IS2404 was detected in 2% of the environmental samples and in 4% of the amoeba cultures. The IS2404 positive amoeba cultures included up to 5 different protozoan species, and originated both from Buruli ulcer endemic and non-endemic communities. This is the first report of experimental infection of amoebae with M. ulcerans and of the detection of the marker IS2404 in amoeba cultures isolated from the environment. We conclude that amoeba are potential natural hosts for M. ulcerans, yet remain sceptical about their implication in the transmission of M. ulcerans to humans and their importance in the epidemiology of Buruli ulcer. Buruli ulcer (BU) is a devastating skin disease caused by Mycobacterium ulcerans, an environmental bacterium that is probably linked to slow-running water. It is unlikely to occur free-living, but even though M. ulcerans DNA has been detected in quite a few different organisms (with most studies focusing on insects), it is still not clear what its real reservoir is. Amoeboid protozoa, inhabitants of biofilms in slow flowing water, are good candidates since all previously tested mycobacteria are resistant to the digestion by these macrophage-like organisms. In this paper we demonstrate that M. ulcerans can indeed infect Acanthamoeba polyphaga in the lab, and remain viable intracellularly. We also collected water, biofilm and detritus samples in BU endemic and non-endemic regions in Ghana. We found that several mycobacteria species commonly occur intracellularly in protozoa in these environments. Amoebae were isolated from almost all samples, and an M. ulcerans marker (IS2404) was detected in 4% of the amoeba cultures. We conclude that amoebae are potential hosts for M. ulcerans. However, because these IS2404 positive amoebae originated from both BU endemic and non-endemic areas, we remain sceptical about their implication in the transmission of M. ulcerans to humans.

1 March 2010 in FEMS Microbiology Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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KVKoen Vandelannoote
Koen Vandelannoote
LDLies Durnez
Lies Durnez
DADiana Amissah
Diana Amissah
SGSophie Gryseels
Sophie Gryseels
ADAlfred Dodoo
Alfred Dodoo
FPFrançoise Portaels
Françoise Portaels
This study reports the first successful application of real-time PCR for the detection of Mycobacterium ulcerans, the causative agent of Buruli ulcer