As important nodes in the air transport system, it is of great significance for airports to achieve the carbon-peaking goal before 2030 under the target of peaking carbon emissions in China’s civil aviation industry. However, it remains unknown whether airports will be able to realize this ambitious goal due to a variety of uncertain factors, such as the social economy, epidemic impact, and emission reduction measures. According to the possibilities of uncertain factors, 12 uncertain scenarios were constructed. Using the case of Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport (CAN), this study predicted medium- and long-term carbon emission trends under 12 uncertain scenarios based on the Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning System (LEAP) model. Furthermore, the effects of carbon abatement measures and emission reduction responsibilities were analyzed. The results show that CAN cannot guarantee that it will realize the goal under the established abatement policy. If socioeconomic development is rapid, carbon emissions will peak at about 90 kt tons in 2030, and if socioeconomic development is slow, it will plateau at about 1 million tons between 2030 and 2035. What is more, airlines bear the greatest responsibility for reducing emissions, and technological progress measures have the highest abatement potential. This study provides decision support for airport stakeholders in abatement work so as to ensure that airports can achieve the carbon-peaking goal.

Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: “initiation”, “development”, and “maturity”, allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at $E_4(0,0,1)$ and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at $E_8(1,1,1)$, promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies.