This study investigates how students of English Language and Literature Studies and those of Translation at the University of Maribor, Slovenia, perceive and engage with digital tools in academic and language learning contexts. Although students report high levels of confidence in their digital skills and express positive attitudes towards educational technologies, the survey results reveal a significant gap between perceived competence and actual usage. The study identifies the underutilization of institutional tools, limited awareness of resources available, and a reliance on general-purpose search engines rather than academic platforms. These findings highlight the need for improved digital literacy training, structured onboarding, and integration of digital tools into discipline-specific curricula. By focusing on a student population specializing in linguistics and translation in a Central and Eastern European context, this research contributes a localized perspective to broader discussions on digital transformation in higher education. The study offers applicable recommendations for enhancing institutional strategies and supporting students in becoming competent and critical users of educational technology.

Prispevek analizira naraščajoč pojav bivanjske praznine pri mladih, ki ga poglablja novo družbeno-tehnološko okolje generativne umetne inteligence (Gen-UI). Avtorji prispevka argumentirajo, da Gen-UI v nasprotju s predhodnimi tehnologijami verjetno ne more biti opredeljena zgolj kot orodje razširjene kognicije, temveč kot dejavnik algokracije, ki spodbuja kognitivno pasivnost in heteronomijo. Slednja po Kantu ogroža osebno avtonomijo, ki je po Franklu predpogoj za osmišljanje bivanja. V drugem delu se prispevek osredotoča na vlogo šole, ki mora v dobi digitalne instrumentalizacije delovati kot »protiokolje«. Namesto nekritičnega prevzemanja tehnologije mora edukacija krepiti pogum za uporabo lastnega razuma in etično presojo. Le s poudarkom na človeškosti, ki vključuje tudi duhovno-religiozno dimenzijo, in oblikovanju osebne avtonomije lahko šola mladim pomaga preseči občutke bivanjske praznine ob hkratni vzpostavitvi kritične distance do algoritmičnih sistemov.

The article offers an internal critique of Fodor’s original argument against the unity of science, claiming that multiple realization in special sciences blocks reduction to physical science and secures their autonomy. Fodor’s argument has been a cornerstone of the argument against reductionism in the philosophy of mind. In this article, we aim to show that it fails even when Fodor’s own presuppositions and his own understandings of key terms are considered. In this sense, the article probes the original argument for its internal consistency. Firstly, we provide an overview of multiple realization, along with the main motivation for it, i.e., the rejection of psychophysical reductionism, and a detailed discussion of Fodor’s claims and key terminology. This is followed by examining Fodor’s argument against psychophysical reductionism using his key example of multiple realization, Gresham’s law in economics. We argue that the law is either not multiply realized or basic sciences are also multiply realized, both options being problematic for Fodor. Turning to the apparent impossibility of reducing ceteris paribus special science laws via exceptionless bridge laws to exceptionless physical laws, we argue that the problem lies in the notion of “proper law”: if understood as an exceptionless law, the argument rests on a contradiction, and if understood as a “not gerrymandered” (not arbitrary) law, the key assumption of the argument, i.e., that special science kinds are natural, is simply false. The original argument, therefore, fails to establish the autonomy of special sciences even if Fodor’s own understanding of key terms is adopted, which leaves him, contrary to his opinion, empty-handed in the battle against psychophysical reductionism.

This article attempts to determine whether we can identify any linguistic differences between songs that are typically considered as propaganda and those considered as counterpropaganda. We analyse a World War I propaganda song (“Over There” by George M. Cohan) and compare it to two rock/metal (counterpropaganda) songs: Muse’s “Uprising” and Gojira’s “Amazonia.” The analysis is done using a finite speech act typology. The findings indicate that propaganda songs utilise a higher percentage of Requests, as the aim of propaganda is often to promote joining some movement or cause. Propaganda typically aims to be familiar, and repetition is used for this purpose: counterpropaganda songs in our analysis are less repetitive compared to propaganda songs. Propaganda and counterpropaganda songs feature the same kinds of Requests, yet the Requests in propaganda songs are unambiguous, concrete and specific, whereas in counterpropaganda songs, they are vague and Finally, Opines are utilised to a higher degree in counterpropaganda, which could be explained by the fact that Opines are inherently subjective, making them unsuitable for delivering the clear and factual messages required by propaganda.

What should the public understand about climate change to form true beliefs and responsibly participate in democratic deliberation? We argue for a partly negative and partly positive answer. Negatively, the public does not need to understand the climate or first-order evidence in climate science: endeavors that pursue such first-order competence, such as mainstream critical thinking (CT) and logic-based inoculation strategies task non-experts with a demand they cannot reliably perform. We demonstrate this by applying such inoculation procedures to a sophisticated and credentialed argument against climate change, and show that encouraging non-experts to evaluate the first-order premises and scientific claims leads to epistemic trespassing. Positively, we argue that what the public actually needs for responsible participation in the climate debate is a more modest and attainable understanding of the social epistemology of science – understanding how the scientific consensus is formed and why the process is more reliable than the alternatives. This kind of understanding transforms blind reliance into rationally warranted trust. In doing so, we distinguish the process of higher-order critical assessment, the understanding it gives, and the calibrated deference it licenses, and we locate higher-order evidence on the side of warranted trust rather than first-order understanding. The result is an epistemically responsible framework for public engagement with climate science that redirects, rather than abandons, critical thinking.