Although the beneficial role of enterprises in the management of construction and demolition waste (CDW) should not be overlooked, existing relevant studies have neglected to address the specific effects of the behavioral decisions of leaders and employees within enterprises in CDW recycling projects. This study creatively introduces psychological contract theory into the field of CDW management and aims to reveal the mechanism of recycling participation behaviors between leaders and employees in CDW recycling projects. Using the Stackelberg game method, a model consisting of leaders and employees in the construction enterprise was constructed to analyze the optimal decision-making of the enterprise under two cases of whether or not the employees contributed additional effort. The conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) The profits of construction enterprise leaders are always positively correlated with the degree of employee additional effort. Unlike the case of leaders, the effect of additional effort on employee profits hinges on the coefficient of employee additional effort. When the coefficient of employee additional effort is below the threshold, excessive additional effort can negatively impact their own profits. When the additional effort coefficient exceeds the threshold, the employee profits are positively related to the degree of additional effort. (2) Similar to the change in employee profits, the change in the total profit of the construction enterprise with the degree of additional effort is influenced by the additional effort coefficient. However, as the additional effort coefficient increases, the total profit of the enterprise shows a significant increase before employee profits. This study enriches the theoretical study of psychological contracts and provides guidance for decision-making between leaders and employees in the management of CDW recycling projects.

While most existing studies addressing greenwashing emphasize governmental regulation, they often overlook the role of public participation. This study examines how managers’ risk preferences affect enterprise decision-making under public scrutiny. In this study, an agent-based simulation model incorporating enterprises, media, and consumers is established on the basis of signaling theory and the wolf-sheep model. The conclusions are as follows: (1) Both positive and negative public opinion can curb greenwashing behavior in building material enterprises, but negative public opinion intensity is more effective in this context. (2) Regardless of whether building material enterprises operate in positive or negative public opinion scenarios, constraining managers’ risk preferences consistently serves as an effective internal mechanism for curbing greenwashing behavior. (3) The effectiveness of constraint managers’ risk preferences in suppressing greenwashing behavior is influenced by the external public opinion scenario, with its inhibitory effect being more pronounced under negative public opinion scenarios. This study incorporates public opinion as a key external factor and integrates dynamic managers’ risk preferences into a behavioral simulation framework. It expands the theoretical understanding of greenwashing decision-making mechanisms and offers practical implications for regulatory enforcement and enterprise governance.

Existing studies on greenwashing have primarily focused on post-incident supervision, with limited attention given to proactive mechanisms. This study aims to develop an early warning evaluation model for greenwashing behavior in building materials enterprises exposed to negative public opinion. The main findings are as follows: (1) Drawing on actor network theory, gray system theory, the analytic network process, and gray fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, this study constructs an early warning evaluation model for greenwashing behavior in building materials enterprises. This model comprises 5 first-level dimensions and 20 s-level indicators, integrating key stakeholders (i.e., government, negative public opinion, media, the public, and enterprise) and is validated through case analysis. (2) Government dimension: Environmental regulation intensity emerges as the most critical indicator. (3) Negative public opinion dimension: Attention is the most critical indicator. (4) Media dimension: Media visibility ranks as the most critical indicator. (5) Public dimension: Public sentiment is the most influential indicator. (6) Enterprise dimension: The environmental performance level is the most critical indicator. This study offers both theoretical and practical foundations for the early warning, monitoring, and governance of enterprise greenwashing, contributing to the advancement of sustainable development and transparent environmental communication in the building materials industry.