Pricing decisions for construction and demolition waste recycling are severely hampered by consumer uncertainty in assessing the value of recycled building materials. This paper uses a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling utilization model that consists of a building materials manufacturer and a building materials remanufacturer and compares both the prices and the profits under different carbon tax scenarios, i.e., consumer risk-averse and risk-neutral scenarios. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) The optimal price of traditional products is always negatively correlated with consumer risk aversion. Unlike traditional products, the optimal price of recycled building materials is negatively related to the degree of consumer risk aversion in the case of a low carbon tax; the opposite conclusion is obtained in the case of a high carbon tax. (2) When the abatement cost coefficient is below the threshold and the carbon tax is low, the profits of the building materials manufacturer and remanufacturer show a U-shaped trend with consumer risk aversion; in the case of a high carbon tax, the profits of the two enterprises are positively correlated with consumer risk aversion. In addition, when the abatement cost coefficient is above the threshold, there is an interval in which the profits of the building materials manufacturer are positively correlated with consumer risk aversion in the case in which the carbon tax satisfies this interval. In all the other cases, there is a U-shaped trend in profits and consumer risk aversion levels for both the building materials manufacturer and the remanufacturer.

Although the beneficial role of enterprises in the management of construction and demolition waste (CDW) should not be overlooked, existing relevant studies have neglected to address the specific effects of the behavioral decisions of leaders and employees within enterprises in CDW recycling projects. This study creatively introduces psychological contract theory into the field of CDW management and aims to reveal the mechanism of recycling participation behaviors between leaders and employees in CDW recycling projects. Using the Stackelberg game method, a model consisting of leaders and employees in the construction enterprise was constructed to analyze the optimal decision-making of the enterprise under two cases of whether or not the employees contributed additional effort. The conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) The profits of construction enterprise leaders are always positively correlated with the degree of employee additional effort. Unlike the case of leaders, the effect of additional effort on employee profits hinges on the coefficient of employee additional effort. When the coefficient of employee additional effort is below the threshold, excessive additional effort can negatively impact their own profits. When the additional effort coefficient exceeds the threshold, the employee profits are positively related to the degree of additional effort. (2) Similar to the change in employee profits, the change in the total profit of the construction enterprise with the degree of additional effort is influenced by the additional effort coefficient. However, as the additional effort coefficient increases, the total profit of the enterprise shows a significant increase before employee profits. This study enriches the theoretical study of psychological contracts and provides guidance for decision-making between leaders and employees in the management of CDW recycling projects.