Embedded devices are pervasive nowadays with the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT). This brings significant security issues that make the security analysis of embedded devices important. This paper presents a survey on the security analysis research of embedded devices. First, we analyze the embedded device types and their operating systems. Then, we describe a major dynamic security analysis method for an embedded device, i.e., simulating the firmware of the embedded device and performing fuzzing on the web interface provided by the firmware. Third, we discuss some other issues in embedded security analysis, such as analyzing the attack surface, applying static analysis, and performing large-scale analysis. Based on these analyses, we finally conclude three challenges in the current research and present our insights for future research directions.
False data injection (FDI) attack is a hot topic in large-scale Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), which can cause bad state estimation of controllers. In this paper, we focus on FDI detection on transmission lines of the smart grid. We propose a novel and effective detection framework to identify FDI attacks. Different from the previous methods, there are multi-tier detectors which utilize edge nodes such as the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) instead of the central controller to detect attacks. The proposed framework can decrease the transmission time of data to reduce the latency of decisions because many sensory data need not be transmitted to the central controller for detection. We also develop a detection algorithm which utilizes classifiers based on machine learning to identify FDI. The training process is split from every edge node and is placed on the central node. The detectors are lightweight and are properly adopted in our detection framework. Our simulation experiments show that the proposed detection framework can provide better detection results than the existing detection approaches.
The ever-expanding power system is developed into an interconnected pattern of power grids. Zone partitioning is an essential technique for the operation and management of such an interconnected power system. Owing to the transmission capacity limitation, transmission congestion may occur with a regional influence on power system. If transmission congestion is considered when the system is decomposed into several regions, the power consumption structure can be optimized and power system planning can be more reasonable. At the same time, power resources can be properly allocated and system safety can be improved. In this paper, we propose a power system zone partitioning method where the potential congested branches are identified and the spectral clustering algorithm is improved. We transform the zone partitioning problem into a graph segmentation problem by constructing an undirected weighted graph of power system where the similarities between buses are measured by the power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) corresponding to the potential congested branches. Zone partitioning results show that the locational marginal price (LMP) in the same zone is similar, which can represent regional price signals and provide regional auxiliary decisions.
A cyber-physical attack in the industrial Internet of Things can cause severe damage to physical system. In this paper, we focus on the command disaggregation attack, wherein attackers modify disaggregated commands by intruding command aggregators like programmable logic controllers, and then maliciously manipulate the physical process. It is necessary to investigate these attacks, analyze their impact on the physical process, and seek effective detection mechanisms. We depict two different types of command disaggregation attack modes: (1) the command sequence is disordered and (2) disaggregated sub-commands are allocated to wrong actuators. We describe three attack models to implement these modes with going undetected by existing detection methods. A novel and effective framework is provided to detect command disaggregation attacks. The framework utilizes the correlations among two-tier command sequences, including commands from the output of central controller and sub-commands from the input of actuators, to detect attacks before disruptions occur. We have designed components of the framework and explain how to mine and use these correlations to detect attacks. We present two case studies to validate different levels of impact from various attack models and the effectiveness of the detection framework. Finally, we discuss how to enhance the detection framework.
False data injection (FDI) attack is a hot topic in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Attackers inject bad data into sensors or return false data to the controller to cause the inaccurate state estimation. Although there exists many detection approaches, such as bad data detector (BDD), sequence pattern mining, and machine learning methods, a smart attacker still can inject perfectly false data to go undetected. In this paper, we focus on the advanced false data injection (AFDI) attack and its detection method. An AFDI attack refers to the attack where a malicious entity accurately and successively changes sensory data, making the normal system state continuously evaluated as other legal system states, causing wrong outflow of controllers. The attack can lead to an automatic and long-term system failure/performance degradation. We first depict the AFDI attack model and analyze limitations of existing detectors for detecting AFDI. Second, we develop an approach based on machine learning, which utilizes the k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) technique and heterogeneous data including sensory data and system commands to implement a classifier for detecting AFDI attacks. Finally, simulation experiments are given to demonstrate AFDI attack impact and the effectiveness of the proposed method for detecting AFDI attacks.