Bo-Yeon Sim

Ms. Bo-Yeon Sim


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 October 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
TLTae-Ho Lee
Tae-Ho Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that are the third-round candidates of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Specifically, we analyze the message encoding operation in the encapsulation phase of lattice-based KEMs to obtain an ephemeral session key. We conclude that a single-trace leakage implies a whole key recovery: the experimental results realized on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board achieve a success rate of 100% for CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER regardless of an optimization level and those greater than 79% for FrodoKEM. We further demonstrate that the proposed attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but are widely applicable to other NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates, including NTRUPrime and NTRU.

2 June 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
APAesun Park
Aesun Park
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
This study proposes a chosen-ciphertext side-channel attack against a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), the third-round candidate of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Unlike existing attacks that target operations, such as inverse NTT and message encoding/decoding, we target $\mathsf {Barrett~reduction}$ in the decapsulation phase of $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}KYBER}$ to obtain a secret key. We show that a sensitive variable-dependent leakage of $\mathsf {Barrett~reduction}$ exposes an entire secret key. The results of experiments conducted on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller accomplish a success rate of 100%. We only need six chosen ciphertexts for $\mathsf {KYBER512}$ and $\mathsf {KYBER768}$ and eight chosen ciphertexts for $\mathsf {KYBER1024}$ . We also show that the $\mathsf {m4}$ scheme of the $\mathsf {pqm4}$ library, an implementation with the ARM Cortex-M4 specific optimization (typically in assembly), is vulnerable to the proposed attack. In this scheme, six, nine, and twelve chosen ciphertexts are required for $\mathsf {KYBER512}$ , $\mathsf {KYBER768}$ , and $\mathsf {KYBER1024}$ , respectively.

14 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
TLTaeho Lee
Taeho Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ . $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ is a lattice-based digital signature algorithm, one of the third round finalists of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. We attack the number-theoretic transform (NTT) in the signing procedure and key generation of $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ to obtain a secret key. When targeting the signing procedure, we can recover both secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ . This enables forgery of signatures. However, only the secret key vector $s_{1}$ can be recovered when targeting the key generation. Thus, we additionally attack four operations, sampling, addition, rounding, and packing, to find $s_{2}$ . We applied a machine learning-based profiling attack method to find the secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ with a single trace.

6 November 2018 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
JKJunki Kang
Junki Kang
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Binary scalar multiplication, which is the main operation of elliptic curve cryptography, is vulnerable to side-channel analysis. It is especially vulnerable to side-channel analysis using power consumption and electromagnetic emission patterns. Thus, various countermeasures have been reported. However, they focused on eliminating patterns of conditional branches, statistical characteristics according to intermediate values, or data inter-relationships. Even though secret scalar bits are directly loaded during the check phase, countermeasures for this phase have not been considered. Therefore, in this paper, we show that there is side-channel leakage associated with secret scalar bit values. We experimented with hardware and software implementations, and experiments were focused on the Montgomery–López–Dahab ladder algorithm protected by scalar randomization in hardware implementations. We show that we could extract secret key bits with a 100% success rate using a single trace. Moreover, our attack did not require sophisticated preprocessing and could defeat existing countermeasures using a single trace. We focused on the key bit identification functions of mbedTLS and OpenSSL in software implementations. The success rate was over 94%, so brute-force attacks could still be able to recover the whole secret scalar bits. We propose a countermeasure and demonstrate experimentally that it can be effectively applied.

30 May 2020 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YWYoo-Seung Won
Yoo-Seung Won
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
JPJong-Yeon Park
Jong-Yeon Park
Since 2002, there have been active discussions on template attacks due to the robust performance of such attacks. There are reports of numerous proposals to improve the accuracy of prediction model in order to identify the point of interest. To date, many researchers have only focused on the performance of template attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to retrieve the secret information in key schedules, without the profiling phase utilizing secret information. The template attack allows us to reveal the correct key even though the encryption/decryption processes have powerful countermeasures. More precisely, if the templates are sufficiently built in loading/saving the public information, in the extraction phase, the templates already created can be applied to the identical operation about secret information, which allows us to retrieve the secret information even if the countermeasures are theoretically robust. This suggestion becomes another backdoor to avoid hardened countermeasures. In order to demonstrate our proposal, we consider the Advanced Encryption Standard key schedule as a target for attack; however, it cannot be the target of non-profiling attacks in general. Finally, the Hamming weight information of the correct key could be recovered in an XMEGA128 chip, without the secret information. Moreover, we concentrate on the potential possibility of our suggestion since the performance cannot outperform the original methods used in such attacks.

31 March 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
YKYeon-Jae Kim
Yeon-Jae Kim
SKSoo-Jin Kim
Soo-Jin Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Bitslice block ciphers have the advantage of allowing parallel computation using bitwise logical operations, and Boolean masking can be applied efficiently. Thus, various bitslice block ciphers, such as Robin, Fantomas, RECTANGLE, RoadRunneR, PRIDE, and CRAFT, have been proposed previously. Additionally, a bitslice implementation for AES, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard block cipher, has been proposed. These ciphers construct an S-Box using only bitwise logical operators. They perform operations by storing the i-th bits of each S-Box input/output value in one register, i.e., they have a feature that each bit of an S-Box output is stored in a different register. Because of this feature, in correlation power analysis (CPA) for bitslice block ciphers, a single-bit of the S-Box output should be selected as an intermediate value. Moreover, depending on which bit is selected as the intermediate value, there are differences in analysis performance. Consequently, we propose an algorithm that predicts the CPA performance of each single-bit and we describe the theoretical basis of this algorithm. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is verified experimentally by comparing actual CPA results and predicted results on various bitslice block ciphers.