Jaeseung Han

Dr. Jaeseung Han

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 October 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
TLTae-Ho Lee
Tae-Ho Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that are the third-round candidates of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Specifically, we analyze the message encoding operation in the encapsulation phase of lattice-based KEMs to obtain an ephemeral session key. We conclude that a single-trace leakage implies a whole key recovery: the experimental results realized on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board achieve a success rate of 100% for CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER regardless of an optimization level and those greater than 79% for FrodoKEM. We further demonstrate that the proposed attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but are widely applicable to other NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates, including NTRUPrime and NTRU.

14 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
TLTaeho Lee
Taeho Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ . $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ is a lattice-based digital signature algorithm, one of the third round finalists of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. We attack the number-theoretic transform (NTT) in the signing procedure and key generation of $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ to obtain a secret key. When targeting the signing procedure, we can recover both secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ . This enables forgery of signatures. However, only the secret key vector $s_{1}$ can be recovered when targeting the key generation. Thus, we additionally attack four operations, sampling, addition, rounding, and packing, to find $s_{2}$ . We applied a machine learning-based profiling attack method to find the secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ with a single trace.

31 March 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
YKYeon-Jae Kim
Yeon-Jae Kim
SKSoo-Jin Kim
Soo-Jin Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Bitslice block ciphers have the advantage of allowing parallel computation using bitwise logical operations, and Boolean masking can be applied efficiently. Thus, various bitslice block ciphers, such as Robin, Fantomas, RECTANGLE, RoadRunneR, PRIDE, and CRAFT, have been proposed previously. Additionally, a bitslice implementation for AES, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard block cipher, has been proposed. These ciphers construct an S-Box using only bitwise logical operators. They perform operations by storing the i-th bits of each S-Box input/output value in one register, i.e., they have a feature that each bit of an S-Box output is stored in a different register. Because of this feature, in correlation power analysis (CPA) for bitslice block ciphers, a single-bit of the S-Box output should be selected as an intermediate value. Moreover, depending on which bit is selected as the intermediate value, there are differences in analysis performance. Consequently, we propose an algorithm that predicts the CPA performance of each single-bit and we describe the theoretical basis of this algorithm. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is verified experimentally by comparing actual CPA results and predicted results on various bitslice block ciphers.

22 June 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSeonghyuck Lim
Seonghyuck Lim
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
With the recent development of the Internet of Things (IoT), related device use is increasing rapidly. As a result, accessing and hijacking the devices is an increasing security threat. The challenges of side-channel security of IoT devices are having a way of coming to the surface due to this physical accessibility. Accordingly, there is active research on lightweight block ciphers to provide security even in resource-scarce environments situations such as IoT. The bit-sliced structure increases memory and time efficiency using an implementation method that replaces a lookup table with a bit-wise operation. Therefore, it is a widely-used design technique for lightweight block ciphers. In this paper, we show a differential fault attack study, a type of side-channel analysis, targeting bit-sliced block ciphers. In particular, it proposes a novel attack rationale on the recently proposed lightweight block cipher PIPO and shows that it applies sufficiently to other bit-sliced block ciphers. The proposed attack is based on a more alleviated attacker’s assumption than the previously proposed attack, and it shows that less than 32 fewer fault ciphertext may fully recover the 128-bit of the PIPO 64/128 secret key. It proves that the attack is practical by verifying the attack through the actual electromagnetic fault injection. It also discusses the applicability of various bit-sliced block ciphers and shows how redundancy-based countermeasures might improve fault-robustness. Therefore, when using the bit-sliced block ciphers on IoT devices, we recommend applying appropriate countermeasures against fault injection attacks.

24 July 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SLSeonghyuck Lim
Seonghyuck Lim
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
TLTae-Ho Lee
Tae-Ho Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han

14 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Shuffling is an essential countermeasure employed during the implementation of cryptographic algorithms to mitigate vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks, regardless of the algorithm’s nature. However, a comprehensive and structured shuffling framework has yet to be established, resulting in the need for developers to create customized solutions adapted to their specific algorithmic or operational requirements. This research paper introduces an innovative and systematic shuffling framework, providing developers with a set of guidelines to effectively select suitable shuffling methodologies aligned with their specific objectives. Additionally, we illustrate the application of this framework to the CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature algorithm, a finalist in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. By leveraging our framework, we devise shuffling countermeasures and present an extensive array of twelve shuffling schemes. For each scheme, shuffling techniques are applied universally to all operations involving any confidential data, regardless of existence of known attacks targeting corresponding data. We also measured the performance of implementations of our shuffling schemes, the minimal overhead is 12.4%.