Dong-Guk Han

Prof. Dr. Dong-Guk Han

Department of Information Security, Cryptography, and Mathematics Kookmin University, Seoul, Korea

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 October 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
TLTae-Ho Lee
Tae-Ho Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that are the third-round candidates of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Specifically, we analyze the message encoding operation in the encapsulation phase of lattice-based KEMs to obtain an ephemeral session key. We conclude that a single-trace leakage implies a whole key recovery: the experimental results realized on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board achieve a success rate of 100% for CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER regardless of an optimization level and those greater than 79% for FrodoKEM. We further demonstrate that the proposed attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but are widely applicable to other NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates, including NTRUPrime and NTRU.

2 June 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
APAesun Park
Aesun Park
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
This study proposes a chosen-ciphertext side-channel attack against a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), the third-round candidate of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Unlike existing attacks that target operations, such as inverse NTT and message encoding/decoding, we target $\mathsf {Barrett~reduction}$ in the decapsulation phase of $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}KYBER}$ to obtain a secret key. We show that a sensitive variable-dependent leakage of $\mathsf {Barrett~reduction}$ exposes an entire secret key. The results of experiments conducted on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller accomplish a success rate of 100%. We only need six chosen ciphertexts for $\mathsf {KYBER512}$ and $\mathsf {KYBER768}$ and eight chosen ciphertexts for $\mathsf {KYBER1024}$ . We also show that the $\mathsf {m4}$ scheme of the $\mathsf {pqm4}$ library, an implementation with the ARM Cortex-M4 specific optimization (typically in assembly), is vulnerable to the proposed attack. In this scheme, six, nine, and twelve chosen ciphertexts are required for $\mathsf {KYBER512}$ , $\mathsf {KYBER768}$ , and $\mathsf {KYBER1024}$ , respectively.

1 February 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YWYoo-Seung Won
Yoo-Seung Won
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
DJDirmanto Jap
Dirmanto Jap
SBShivam Bhasin
Shivam Bhasin
JPJong-Yeon Park
Jong-Yeon Park
Over the years, deep learning algorithms have advanced a lot and any innovation in the algorithms are demonstrated and benchmarked for image classification. Several other field including side-channel analysis (SCA) have recently adopted deep learning with great success. In SCA, the deep learning algorithms are typically working with 1-dimensional (1-D) data. In this work, we propose a unique method to improve deep learning based side-channel analysis by converting the measurements from raw-trace of 1-dimension data based on float or byte data into picture-formatted trace that has information based on the data position. We demonstrate why “Picturization” is more suitable for deep learning and compare how input and hidden layers interact for each raw (1-D) and picture form. As one potential application, we use a Binarized Neural Network (BNN) learning method that relies on a BNN's natural properties to improve variables. In addition, we propose a novel criterion for attack success or failure based on statistical confidence level rather than determination of a correct key using a ranking system.

8 November 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HKHangi Kim
Hangi Kim
YJYongjin Jeon
Yongjin Jeon
GKGiyoon Kim
Giyoon Kim
JKJongsung Kim
Jongsung Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
DHDeukjo Hong
Deukjo Hong
Bit permutations are efficient linear functions often used for lightweight cipher designs. However, they have low diffusion effects, compared to word-oriented binary and maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices. Thus, the security of bit permutation-based ciphers is significantly affected by differential and linear branch numbers (DBN and LBN) of nonlinear functions. In this paper, we introduce a widely applicable method for constructing S-boxes with high DBN and LBN. Our method exploits constructions of S-boxes from smaller S-boxes and it derives/proves the required conditions for smaller S-boxes so that the DBN and LBN of the constructed S-boxes are at least 3. These conditions enable us to significantly reduce the search space required to create such S-boxes. Using the unbalanced- Bridge and unbalanced- MISTY structures, we develop a variety of new lightweight S-boxes that provide not only both DBN and LBN of at least 3 but also efficient bitsliced implementations including at most 11 nonlinear bitwise operations. The new S-boxes are the first that exhibit these characteristics.

14 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
TLTaeho Lee
Taeho Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ . $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ is a lattice-based digital signature algorithm, one of the third round finalists of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. We attack the number-theoretic transform (NTT) in the signing procedure and key generation of $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ to obtain a secret key. When targeting the signing procedure, we can recover both secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ . This enables forgery of signatures. However, only the secret key vector $s_{1}$ can be recovered when targeting the key generation. Thus, we additionally attack four operations, sampling, addition, rounding, and packing, to find $s_{2}$ . We applied a machine learning-based profiling attack method to find the secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ with a single trace.

1 June 2020 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HLHanSeop Lim
HanSeop Lim
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Theoretical process of fault injection attacks is defined as a process of recovering a secret key assuming that an attacker can inject faults into a specific targeted operation. Therefore, an artificial triggering is required to execute such an attack. However, when conducting analysis on real devices, artificial triggering needs to rely on a powerful assumption, such as manipulation of internal codes. In this paper, we propose a novel fault injection system using Input/Output (I/O) signals of target devices as a trigger for relaxing an attacker assumption. This system does not require an implementation of artificial triggering as input signals are used as a trigger in transmission of plaintexts for fault injection attacks. As a result, the attacker can perform fault injection attacks concerning the entire encryption process. To decide the fault injection time based on the trigger, the proposed system applies simple power analysis (SPA), employing electromagnetic emission of target devices. Considering that the fault injection time identified by SPA can be relatively vague compared with that obtained using a system based on an artificial triggering, we address this problem by proposing a process to recover the secret key without knowing the byte index of an injected fault.