Jihoon Kwon

Mr. Jihoon Kwon

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 October 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
TLTae-Ho Lee
Tae-Ho Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that are the third-round candidates of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. Specifically, we analyze the message encoding operation in the encapsulation phase of lattice-based KEMs to obtain an ephemeral session key. We conclude that a single-trace leakage implies a whole key recovery: the experimental results realized on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board achieve a success rate of 100% for CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER regardless of an optimization level and those greater than 79% for FrodoKEM. We further demonstrate that the proposed attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but are widely applicable to other NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates, including NTRUPrime and NTRU.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SKSeongkwang Kim
Seongkwang Kim
JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
MSMincheol Son
Mincheol Son
BLByeonghak Lee
Byeonghak Lee
DMDukjae Moon
Dukjae Moon
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee
Post-quantum signature schemes based on the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm are recently attracting significant attention as their security solely depends on the one-wayness of the underlying primitive, providing diversity for the hardness assumption in post-quantum cryptography. Recent MPCitH-friendly ciphers have been designed using simple algebraic S-boxes operating on a large field in order to improve the performance of the resulting signature schemes. Due to their simple algebraic structures, their security against algebraic attacks should be comprehensively studied. In this paper, we refine algebraic cryptanalysis of power mapping based S-boxes over binary extension fields, and cryptographic primitives based on such S-boxes. In particular, for the Gröbner basis attack over ⅇ2, we experimentally show that the exact number of Boolean quadratic equations obtained from the underlying S-boxes is critical to correctly estimate the theoretic complexity based on the degree of regularity. Similarly, it turns out that the XL attack might be faster when all possible quadratic equations are found and used from the S-boxes. This refined cryptanalysis leads to more precise algebraic analysis of cryptographic primitives based on algebraic S-boxes. Considering the refined algebraic cryptanalysis, we propose a new one-way function, dubbed AIM, as an MPCitH-friendly symmetric primitive with high resistance to algebraic attacks. The security of AIM is comprehensively analyzed with respect to algebraic, statistical, quantum, and generic attacks. AIM is combined with the BN++ proof system, yielding a new signature scheme, dubbed AIM. Our implementation shows that AIM outperforms existing signature schemes based on symmetric primitives in terms of signature size and signing time.

14 December 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
TLTaeho Lee
Taeho Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
IKIl-Ju Kim
Il-Ju Kim
BSBo-Yeon Sim
Bo-Yeon Sim
In this paper, we propose single-trace side-channel attacks against $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ . $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ is a lattice-based digital signature algorithm, one of the third round finalists of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project. We attack the number-theoretic transform (NTT) in the signing procedure and key generation of $\mathsf {CRYSTALS{-}DILITHIUM}$ to obtain a secret key. When targeting the signing procedure, we can recover both secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ . This enables forgery of signatures. However, only the secret key vector $s_{1}$ can be recovered when targeting the key generation. Thus, we additionally attack four operations, sampling, addition, rounding, and packing, to find $s_{2}$ . We applied a machine learning-based profiling attack method to find the secret key vectors $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ with a single trace.

14 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Shuffling is an essential countermeasure employed during the implementation of cryptographic algorithms to mitigate vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks, regardless of the algorithm’s nature. However, a comprehensive and structured shuffling framework has yet to be established, resulting in the need for developers to create customized solutions adapted to their specific algorithmic or operational requirements. This research paper introduces an innovative and systematic shuffling framework, providing developers with a set of guidelines to effectively select suitable shuffling methodologies aligned with their specific objectives. Additionally, we illustrate the application of this framework to the CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature algorithm, a finalist in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. By leveraging our framework, we devise shuffling countermeasures and present an extensive array of twelve shuffling schemes. For each scheme, shuffling techniques are applied universally to all operations involving any confidential data, regardless of existence of known attacks targeting corresponding data. We also measured the performance of implementations of our shuffling schemes, the minimal overhead is 12.4%.

29 March 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJoohee Lee
Joohee Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
JSJi Sun Shin
Ji Sun Shin
Continuous Key Agreement (CKA) is a two-party protocol used in double-ratchet protocols such as signal. It enables continuous and synchronous key distribution that generates a fresh key to encrypt each transaction in messenger apps. It guarantees forward secrecy and post-compromise security. In recent years, the post-quantum versions of the double-ratchet protocol and CKA have been intensively studied. In Eurocrypt 2019, Alwen et al . suggest a generic construction of CKA based on the Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), achieving the post-quantum CKA from post-quantum KEMs. They also mention that the bandwidth can be reduced by half using ElGamal KEM. In this paper, we generalize this idea by defining a new primitive called Decomposable Key Encapsulation Mechanism (DKEM) and instantiate it with the promising lattice-based schemes such as CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER. Using DKEM instantiated with CRYSTALS-KYBER ( resp . SABER) and security category 1 parameters, our CKA achieves 51% ( resp . 48%) reduced bandwidths compared to the generic construction from KEM. We also implement our CKA on both Intel Xeon E5-1650 v3 and ARMv8 Cortex-A72 processors, respectively, and show that the performance of sender algorithm is improved from 79.29 to 96.94% ( resp . from 74.64 to 91.04%) when instantiated with CRYSTALS-KYBER ( resp . SABER).

31 May 2018 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
SSSEOGCHUNG SEO
SEOGCHUNG SEO
Seokhie HongSeokhie Hong
Seokhie Hong
In this paper, we present the first constant-time implementations of four-dimensional Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone and Galbraith–Lin–Scott (GLV-GLS) scalar multiplication using curve Ted 127 - glv 4 on 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, and 32-bit ARM processors. In Asiacrypt 2012, Longa and Sica introduced the four-dimensional GLV-GLS scalar multiplication, and they reported the implementation results on Intel processors. However, they did not consider efficient implementations on resource-constrained embedded devices. We have optimized the performance of scalar multiplication using curve Ted 127 - glv 4 on 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, and 32-bit ARM processors. Our implementations compute a variable-base scalar multiplication in 6,856,026, 4,158,453, and 447,836 cycles on AVR, MSP430, and ARM Cortex-M4 processors, respectively. Recently, Four Q -based scalar multiplication has provided the fastest implementation results on AVR, MSP430, and ARM Cortex-M4 processors to date. Compared to Four Q -based scalar multiplication, the proposed implementations require 4.49% more computational cost on AVR, but save 2.85% and 4.61% cycles on MSP430 and ARM, respectively. Our 16-bit and 32-bit implementation results set new speed records for variable-base scalar multiplication.