Jia Zhang

Jia Zhang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Jia Zhang

Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
WXWei Xu
Wei Xu
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
TWTao Wan
Tao Wan
In this paper, we present a new DNS amplification attack, named TsuKing. Instead of exploiting individual DNS resolvers independently to achieve an amplification effect, TsuKing deftly coordinates numerous vulnerable DNS resolvers and crafted queries together to form potent DoS amplifiers. We demconstrate that with TsuKing, an initial small amplification factor can inrease exponentially through the internal layers of coordinated amplifiers, resulting in an extremely powerful amplification attack. TsuKing has three variants, including DNSRetry, DNSChain, and DNSLoop, all of which exploit a suite of inconsistent DNS implementations to achieve enormous amplification effect. With comprehensive measurements, we found that about 14.5% of 1.3M open DNS resolvers are potentially vulnerable to TsuKing. Real-world controlled evaluations indicated that attackers can achieve a packet amplification factor of at least 3,700X (DNSChain). We have reported vulnerabilities to affected vendors and provided them with mitigation recommendations. We have received positive responses from 6 vendors, including Unbound, MikroTik, and AliDNS, and 3 CVEs were assigned. Some of them are implementing our recommendations.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZhenrui Zhang
Zhenrui Zhang
GHGeng Hong
Geng Hong
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
ZFZhuoqun Fu
Zhuoqun Fu
JZJia Zhang
Jia Zhang
MYMin Yang
Min Yang
Cryptocurrency mining is a crucial operation in blockchains, and miners often join mining pools to increase their chances of earning rewards. However, the energy-intensive nature of PoW cryptocurrency mining has led to its ban in New York State of the United States, China, and India. As a result, mining pools, serving as a central hub for mining activities, have become prime targets for regulatory enforcement. Furthermore, cryptojacking malware refers to self-owned stealthy mining pools to evade detection techniques and conceal profit wallet addresses. However, no systematic research has been conducted to analyze it, largely due to a lack of full understanding of the protocol implementation, usage, and port distribution of the stealth mining pool. To the best of our knowledge, we carry out the first large-scale and longitudinal measurement research of stealthy mining pools to fill this gap. We report 7,629 stealthy mining pools among 59 countries. Further, we study the inner mechanisms of stealthy mining pools. By examining the 19,601 stealthy mining pool domains and IPs, our analysis reveals that stealthy mining pools carefully craft their domain semantics, protocol support, and lifespan to provide underground, user-friendly, and robust mining services. What's worse, we uncover a strong correlation between stealthy mining pools and malware, with 23.3% of them being labeled as malicious. Besides, we evaluate the tricks used to evade state-of-the-art mining detection, including migrating domain name resolution methods, leveraging the botnet, and enabling TLS encryption. Finally, we conduct a qualitative study to evaluate the profit gains of malicious cryptomining activities through the stealthy pool from an insider perspective. Our results show that criminals have the potential to earn more than 1 million USD per year, boasting an average ROI of 2,750%. We have informed the relevant ISPs about uncovered stealthy mining pools and have received their acknowledgments.

4 November 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
SXShaodong Xiao
Shaodong Xiao
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
YLYanzhong Lin
Yanzhong Lin
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
JSJun Shao
Jun Shao
Abnormal email bounces seriously disrupt user lives and company transactions. Proliferating security protocols and protection strategies have made email delivery increasingly complex. A natural question is how and why email delivery fails in the wild. Filling this knowledge gap requires a representative global email delivery dataset, which is rarely disclosed by email service providers (ESPs). In this paper, we first systematically reveal the scale and root causes of email bounces, and evaluate the email squatting risk in the real world. Through a 15-month passive dataset from a large ESP, we present a unique global view of 298M emails delivered to 3M receiver mail servers in 169 countries. We find that 38M (12.93%) emails fail to be delivered in the first attempt, about one-third of which could be successfully delivered after retrying, while the rest are permanently undeliverable. Delving deeper into bounce reasons, we observe that poor server reputation and network communication quality are significant factors leading to temporary email bounces. In particular, spam blocklists affect many normal email deliveries. The misconfiguration of authentication mechanisms and email address typos result in many permanently undeliverable emails. More seriously, many email addresses with significant residual value can be exploited by squatting attackers. Overall, we call for the community to revisit email delivery failures, especially to improve standards for email bounce reporting and resolution.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YQYue Qin
Yue Qin
ZFZhuoqun Fu
Zhuoqun Fu
CDChuyun Deng
Chuyun Deng
XLXiaojing Liao
Xiaojing Liao
JZJia Zhang
Jia Zhang
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
Verifiable robust machine learning, as a new trend of ML security defense, enforces security properties (e.g., Lipschitzness, Monotonicity) on machine learning models and achieves satisfying accuracy-security trade-off. Such security properties identify a series of evasion strategies of ML security attackers and specify logical constraints on their effects on a classifier (e.g., the classifier is monotonically increasing along some feature dimensions). However, little has been done so far to understand the side effect of those security properties on the model privacy. In this paper, we aim at better understanding the privacy impacts on security properties of robust ML models. Particularly, we report the first measurement study to investigate the model stolen risks of robust models satisfying four security properties (i.e., LocalInvariance, Lipschitzness, SmallNeighborhood, and Monotonicity). Our findings bring to light the factors that influence model stealing attacks and defense performance on models trained with security properties. In addition, to train an ML model satisfying goals in accuracy, security, and privacy, we propose a novel technique, called BoundaryFuzz, which introduces a privacy property into verifiable robust training frameworks to defend against model stealing attacks on robust models. Experimental results demonstrate the defense effectiveness of BoundaryFuzz.

19 November 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
ZXZuyao Xu
Zuyao Xu
FMFasheng Miao
Fasheng Miao
YQYuqi Qiu
Yuqi Qiu
DFDunqiu Fan
Dunqiu Fan

15 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YLYijing Liu
Yijing Liu
MLMingxuan Liu
Mingxuan Liu
YZYiming Zhang
Yiming Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
JZJia Zhang
Jia Zhang
MYMin Yang
Min Yang