Hangwei Lu

Hangwei Lu

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Hangwei Lu

Florida Institute for Cybersecurity Research (FICS), University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32601, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 September 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RWRonald Wilson
Ronald Wilson
HLHangwei Lu
Hangwei Lu
MZMengdi Zhu
Mengdi Zhu
DFDomenic Forte
Domenic Forte
DWDamon Woodard
Damon Woodard
Comprehensive hardware assurance approaches guaranteeing trust on Integrated Circuits (ICs) typically require the verification of the IC design layout and functionality through destructive Reverse Engineering (RE). It is a resource intensive process that will benefit greatly from the extensive integration of data-driven paradigms, especially in the imaging and image analysis phase. Although obvious, this uptake of data-driven approaches into RE-assisted hardware assurance is lagging due to the lack of massive amounts of high-quality labelled data. In this paper, a large-scale synthetic Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) dataset, REFICS, is introduced to address this issue. The dataset, the first open-source dataset in the RE community, consists of 800,000 SEM images over two node technologies, 32nm and 90nm, and four cardinal layers of the IC, namely, doping, polysilicon, contact and metal layers. Furthermore, a framework, based on uncertainty and risk, is introduced to compare the efficacy and benefits of existing RE workflows utilizing ad-hoc steps in its execution. These developments are critical in developing RE-assisted hardware assurance into a scalable, automated and fault-tolerant approach. Finally, the work is concluded with the performance analysis of existing machine learning and deep learning approaches for image analysis in RE and hardware assurance.

20 July 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NVNidish Vashistha
Nidish Vashistha
HLHangwei Lu
Hangwei Lu
QSQihang Shi
Qihang Shi
DWDamon Woodard
Damon Woodard
Navid AsadiNavid Asadi
Navid Asadi
MTMark M. Tehranipoor
Mark M. Tehranipoor
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in integrated circuits (ICs) with an intent to breach security and compromise the reliability of an electronic system. This article proposes a framework using self-testing, advanced imaging, and image processing with machine learning to detect hardware Trojans inserted by untrusted foundries. It includes on-chip test structures with negligible power, delay, and silicon area overheads. The core step of the framework is on-chip golden circuit design, which can provide authentic samples for image-based Trojan detection through self-testing. This core step enables a golden-chip-free Trojan detection that does not rely on an existing image data set from Trojan-free chip or image synthesizing. We have conducted an in-depth analysis of detection steps and discussed possible attacks with countermeasures to strengthen this framework. The performance evaluation on a 28-nm FPGA and a 90-nm IC validates its high accuracy and reliability for practical applications.