Rust programming language is gaining popularity rapidly in building reliable and secure systems due to its security guarantees and outstanding performance. To provide extra functionalities, the Rust compiler introduces Rust unstable features (RUF) to extend compiler functionality, syntax, and standard library support. However, these features are unstable and may get removed, introducing compilation failures to dependent packages. Even worse, their impacts propagate through transitive dependencies, causing large-scale failures in the whole ecosystem. Although RUF is widely used in Rust, previous research has primarily concentrated on Rust code safety, with the usage and impacts of RUF from the Rust compiler remaining unexplored. Therefore, we aim to bridge this gap by systematically analyzing the RUF usage and impacts in the Rust ecosystem. We propose novel techniques for extracting RUF precisely, and to assess its impact on the entire ecosystem quantitatively, we accurately resolve package dependencies. We have analyzed the whole Rust ecosystem with 590K package versions and 140M transitive dependencies. Our study shows that the Rust ecosystem uses 1000 different RUF, and at most 44% of package versions are affected by RUF, causing compiling failures for at most 12% of package versions. To mitigate wide RUF impacts, we further design and implement a RUF-compilation-failure recovery tool that can recover up to 90% of the failure. We believe our techniques, findings, and tools can help stabilize the Rust compiler, ultimately enhancing the security and reliability of the Rust ecosystem.
22 May 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
OS-level virtualization (a.k.a. container) has become a fundamental technology in cloud computing due to the efficiency provided by the shared-kernel design. However, this design results in containers sharing thousands of kernel variables and data structures (termed abstract resources ), which are prevalent but under-protected. Without exploiting other kernel vulnerabilities, a non-privileged container can easily exhaust abstract resources to cause DoS attacks against other containers. Even worse, our experiments demonstrate that abstract resource attacks are a broad class of attacks that affect Linux, FreeBSD, Fuchsia, and all shared-kernel container environments on the top four cloud vendors. To defend against the abstract resource attack, we automatically analyze vulnerable abstract resources in the Linux kernel and detect 501 container-exhaustible resources. To confine these abstract resources dynamically, we propose two new techniques: the flexible in-kernel attachment for flexible resource consumption attachment and the tree-based resource accounting for efficient usage retrieval. Based on these two techniques, we design and implement a fl exible a bstract re s ource confinement framewor k , named Flask, to achieve flexible and efficient abstract resource confinement. Our evaluation shows Flask can efficiently limit abstract resource usage with less than 0.6% performance overhead.
11 March 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Rust programming language is gaining popularity rapidly in building reliable and secure systems due to its security guarantees and outstanding performance. To provide extra functionalities, the Rust compiler introduces Rust unstable features (RUFs) to extend compiler functionality, syntax, and standard library support. However, their inherent instability poses significant challenges, including potential removal that can lead to large-scale compilation failures across the entire ecosystem. While our original study provided the first ecosystem-wide analysis of RUF usage and impacts, this extended study builds upon our prior work to further explore RUF evolution, propagation, and mitigation. We introduce novel techniques for extracting and matching RUF APIs across compiler versions and find that proportion of RUF APIs has increased from 3% to 15%. Our analysis of 590K package versions and 140M transitive dependencies reveals that the Rust ecosystem uses 1,000 different RUFs, and 44% of package versions are affected by RUFs, causing compiling failures for 12% of package versions. Additionally, we also extend our analysis outside the ecosystem and find that popular Rust applications also rely heavily on RUFs. To mitigate the impacts of RUFs, we propose a mitigation technique integrated into the build process without requiring developer intervention. Our audit algorithm can systematically adjust dependencies and compiler versions to resolve RUF-induced compilation failures, successfully recovering 91% of compilation failures caused by RUFs. We believe our techniques, findings, and tools can help to stabilize the Rust compiler, ultimately enhancing the security and reliability of the ecosystem.
9 September 2025 in International Journal of Information Security