Eihal Alowaisheq

Eihal Alowaisheq

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Eihal Alowaisheq

King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FZFenglu Zhang
Fenglu Zhang
YZYunyi Zhang
Yunyi Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
EAEihal Alowaisheq
Eihal Alowaisheq
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
MZMin Zhang
Min Zhang
Leveraging DNS for covert communications is appealing since most networks allow DNS traffic, especially the ones directed toward renowned DNS hosting services. Unfortunately, most DNS hosting services overlook domain ownership verification, enabling miscreants to host undelegated DNS records of a domain they do not own. Consequently, miscreants can conduct covert communication through such undelegated records for whitelisted domains on reputable hosting providers. In this paper, we shed light on the emerging threat posed by undelegated records and demonstrate their exploitation in the wild. To the best of our knowledge, this security risk has not been studied before. We conducted a comprehensive measurement to reveal the prevalence of the risk. In total, we observed 1,580,925 unique undelegated records that are potentially abused. We further observed that a considerable portion of these records are associated with malicious behaviors. By utilizing threat intelligence and malicious traffic collected by malware sandbox, we extracted malicious IP addresses from 25.41% of these records, spanning 1,369 Tranco top 2K domains and 248 DNS hosting providers, including Cloudflare and Amazon. Furthermore, we discovered that the majority of the identified malicious activities are Trojan-related. Moreover, we conducted case studies on two malware families (Dark.IOT and Specter) that exploit undelegated records to obtain C2 servers, in addition to the masquerading SPF records to conceal SMTP-based covert communication. Also, we provided mitigation options for different entities. As a result of our disclosure, several popular hosting providers have taken action to address this issue.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FZFenglu Zhang
Fenglu Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
EAEihal Alowaisheq
Eihal Alowaisheq
JCJianjun Chen
Jianjun Chen
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
MYMin Yang
Min Yang
Authoritative nameservers are delegated to provide the final resource record. Since the security and robustness of DNS are critical to the general operation of the Internet, domain name owners are required to deploy multiple candidate nameservers for traffic load balancing. Once the load balancing mechanism is compromised, an adversary can manipulate a large number of legitimate DNS requests to a specified candidate nameserver. As a result, it may not only bypass the defense mechanisms used to filter malicious traffic that can overload the victim nameserver, but also lowers the bar for DNS traffic hijacking and cache poisoning attacks. In this study, we report a class of DNS vulnerabilities and present a novel attack named Disablance. Our proposed attack allows adversaries to stealthily sabotage the DNS load balancing for authoritative nameservers at a low cost. By just performing a handful of crafted requests, an adversary can manipulate a given DNS resolver to overload a specific authoritative server for a period of time. Therefore, Disablance can redirect benign DNS requests for all hosted domains to the specific nameserver and disrupts the load balancing mechanism. The above attack undermines the robustness of DNS resolution and increases the security threat of single point of failure. Our extensive study proves the security threat of Disablance is realistic and prevalent. First, we demonstrated that mainstream DNS implementations, including BIND9, PowerDNS and Microsoft DNS, are vulnerable to Disablance. Second, we developed a measurement framework to measure vulnerable authoritative servers in the wild. 22.24% of top 1M FQDNs and 3.94% of top 1M SLDs were proven can be the victims of Disablance. Our measurement results also show that 37.88% of stable open resolvers and 10 of 14 popular public DNS services can be exploited to conduct Disablance, including Cloudflare and Quad9. Furthermore, the critical security threats of Disablance were observed and acknowledged through in-depth discussion with a world-leading DNS service provider. We have reported discovered vulnerabilities and provided recommendations to the affected vendors. Until now, Tencent Cloud (DNSPod) and Amazon have taken action to fix this issue according to our suggestions.

28 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FZFenglu Zhang
Fenglu Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
EAEihal Alowaisheq
Eihal Alowaisheq
JCJianjun Chen
Jianjun Chen
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
MYMin Yang
Min Yang
We present a new attack, the Disablance, that disrupts the load balancing for authoritative DNS servers. We discovered a prevalent misconfiguration for nameservers and an implementation decision in mainstream DNS software that an adversary can leverage to divert legitimate DNS traffic to a targeted nameserver. Through a systematic evaluation, we confirmed that Disablance is realistic, efficient, and prevalent. In total, 22.24% of the top 1M FQDNs and 3.94% of the top 1M SLDs can be victims of Disablance. Besides, a number of stable open resolvers and several well-known public DNS service providers are also exploitable. Moving forward, we provided suggestions to mitigate the threat of Disablance and responsibly disclosed this issue to service providers. As of the time of writing this paper, several renowned vendors have taken action to fix it.

19 November 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DWDashuai Wu
Dashuai Wu
YZYunyi Zhang
Yunyi Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
EAEihal Alowaisheq
Eihal Alowaisheq
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan