Jianjun Chen

Jianjun Chen

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Jianjun Chen

Tsinghua University & Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
WXWei Xu
Wei Xu
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
TWTao Wan
Tao Wan
In this paper, we present a new DNS amplification attack, named TsuKing. Instead of exploiting individual DNS resolvers independently to achieve an amplification effect, TsuKing deftly coordinates numerous vulnerable DNS resolvers and crafted queries together to form potent DoS amplifiers. We demconstrate that with TsuKing, an initial small amplification factor can inrease exponentially through the internal layers of coordinated amplifiers, resulting in an extremely powerful amplification attack. TsuKing has three variants, including DNSRetry, DNSChain, and DNSLoop, all of which exploit a suite of inconsistent DNS implementations to achieve enormous amplification effect. With comprehensive measurements, we found that about 14.5% of 1.3M open DNS resolvers are potentially vulnerable to TsuKing. Real-world controlled evaluations indicated that attackers can achieve a packet amplification factor of at least 3,700X (DNSChain). We have reported vulnerabilities to affected vendors and provided them with mitigation recommendations. We have received positive responses from 6 vendors, including Unbound, MikroTik, and AliDNS, and 3 CVEs were assigned. Some of them are implementing our recommendations.

27 February 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
JLJianyu Lu
Jianyu Lu
YZYiming Zhang
Yiming Zhang
XZXiaofeng Zheng
Xiaofeng Zheng
Public hosting services provide convenience for domain owners to build web applications with better scalability and security. However, if a domain name points to released service endpoints (e.g., nameservers allocated by a provider), adversaries can take over the domain by applying the same endpoints. Such a security threat is called "hosting-based domain takeover''. In recent years, a large number of domain takeover incidents have occurred; even well-known websites like the subdomains of microsoft.com have been impacted. However, until now, there has been no effective detection system to identify these vulnerable domains on a large scale. In this paper, we fill this research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. Compared with previous work, HostingChecker expands the detection scope and improves the detection efficiency by: (i) systematically identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) effectively detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. We evaluate the effectiveness of HostingChecker and eventually detect 10,351 subdomains from Tranco Top-1M apex domains vulnerable to domain takeover, which are over 8× more than previous findings. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors, like Amazon and Alibaba, and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed implementation of domain ownership validation. Following responsible disclosure processes, we have reported issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZhenrui Zhang
Zhenrui Zhang
GHGeng Hong
Geng Hong
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
ZFZhuoqun Fu
Zhuoqun Fu
JZJia Zhang
Jia Zhang
MYMin Yang
Min Yang
Cryptocurrency mining is a crucial operation in blockchains, and miners often join mining pools to increase their chances of earning rewards. However, the energy-intensive nature of PoW cryptocurrency mining has led to its ban in New York State of the United States, China, and India. As a result, mining pools, serving as a central hub for mining activities, have become prime targets for regulatory enforcement. Furthermore, cryptojacking malware refers to self-owned stealthy mining pools to evade detection techniques and conceal profit wallet addresses. However, no systematic research has been conducted to analyze it, largely due to a lack of full understanding of the protocol implementation, usage, and port distribution of the stealth mining pool. To the best of our knowledge, we carry out the first large-scale and longitudinal measurement research of stealthy mining pools to fill this gap. We report 7,629 stealthy mining pools among 59 countries. Further, we study the inner mechanisms of stealthy mining pools. By examining the 19,601 stealthy mining pool domains and IPs, our analysis reveals that stealthy mining pools carefully craft their domain semantics, protocol support, and lifespan to provide underground, user-friendly, and robust mining services. What's worse, we uncover a strong correlation between stealthy mining pools and malware, with 23.3% of them being labeled as malicious. Besides, we evaluate the tricks used to evade state-of-the-art mining detection, including migrating domain name resolution methods, leveraging the botnet, and enabling TLS encryption. Finally, we conduct a qualitative study to evaluate the profit gains of malicious cryptomining activities through the stealthy pool from an insider perspective. Our results show that criminals have the potential to earn more than 1 million USD per year, boasting an average ROI of 2,750%. We have informed the relevant ISPs about uncovered stealthy mining pools and have received their acknowledgments.


2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YLYuejia Liang
Yuejia Liang
JCJianjun Chen
Jianjun Chen
RGRun Guo
Run Guo
KSKaiwen Shen
Kaiwen Shen
HJHui Jiang
Hui Jiang
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
Web cache poisoning (WCP) has posed significant threats to Internet security by causing the cache server to deliver malicious responses to innocent users. This results in widespread denial of access to website resources and potential injection of harmful payloads. However, prior works on WCP vulnerability have been fragmented and conducted in a case-by-case form, lacking a systematic analysis of the threat landscape. In this paper, we fill this research gap by conducting a systematic evaluation of WCP vulnerabilities at scale. We propose HCache, a novel testing methodology to facilitates the widespread identification of WCP vulnerabilities. We evaluated our methodology against Tranco Top 1000 domains and their subdomains, and found that over 1,000 websites across 172 domains, representing 17% of the evaluated domains, are vulnerable to WCP. In particular, we have identified 7 new attack vectors stemming from previously unexplored caching headers. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to the affected websites and received acknowledgements and bug bounties from world-famous companies, such as Alibaba, Adobe, Huawei, and Microsoft.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FZFenglu Zhang
Fenglu Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
EAEihal Alowaisheq
Eihal Alowaisheq
JCJianjun Chen
Jianjun Chen
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
MYMin Yang
Min Yang
Authoritative nameservers are delegated to provide the final resource record. Since the security and robustness of DNS are critical to the general operation of the Internet, domain name owners are required to deploy multiple candidate nameservers for traffic load balancing. Once the load balancing mechanism is compromised, an adversary can manipulate a large number of legitimate DNS requests to a specified candidate nameserver. As a result, it may not only bypass the defense mechanisms used to filter malicious traffic that can overload the victim nameserver, but also lowers the bar for DNS traffic hijacking and cache poisoning attacks. In this study, we report a class of DNS vulnerabilities and present a novel attack named Disablance. Our proposed attack allows adversaries to stealthily sabotage the DNS load balancing for authoritative nameservers at a low cost. By just performing a handful of crafted requests, an adversary can manipulate a given DNS resolver to overload a specific authoritative server for a period of time. Therefore, Disablance can redirect benign DNS requests for all hosted domains to the specific nameserver and disrupts the load balancing mechanism. The above attack undermines the robustness of DNS resolution and increases the security threat of single point of failure. Our extensive study proves the security threat of Disablance is realistic and prevalent. First, we demonstrated that mainstream DNS implementations, including BIND9, PowerDNS and Microsoft DNS, are vulnerable to Disablance. Second, we developed a measurement framework to measure vulnerable authoritative servers in the wild. 22.24% of top 1M FQDNs and 3.94% of top 1M SLDs were proven can be the victims of Disablance. Our measurement results also show that 37.88% of stable open resolvers and 10 of 14 popular public DNS services can be exploited to conduct Disablance, including Cloudflare and Quad9. Furthermore, the critical security threats of Disablance were observed and acknowledged through in-depth discussion with a world-leading DNS service provider. We have reported discovered vulnerabilities and provided recommendations to the affected vendors. Until now, Tencent Cloud (DNSPod) and Amazon have taken action to fix this issue according to our suggestions.