By exploiting advances in deep learning (DL), several DL-based profiled side-channel analyses (SCAs) have been performed. DL-based profiling analysis is a technique that trains the relationship between side-channel information (e.g., electromagnetic leaks and power consumption) and the intermediate values of side-channel information on a neural network (NN) and then finds the secret key of an attack device using the trained NN. Recently, cross-device profiled SCA has been proposed to consider the realistic DL-based profiled SCA scenarios. However, it has a limitation in that attack performance is lowered if the profiling and attack devices have different target chips. In this study, an environment in which the attack device has a target chip different from the profiling device is defined as different-device and a novel DL-based profiled SCA on different-device is proposed. In addition, multiscale convolution NN, an NN architecture that trains preprocessed and original data in batches, is used to extract and train the characteristics of each data. We experimented with six boards to verify the attack performance of the proposed method. As a result, applying the proposed method reduced the number of attack traces required for the guessing entropy to converge to zero by up to 45 times compared with without applying it.
Side-channel analysis is a type of cryptanalysis that utilizes the physical leakage of a cryptographic device. An adversary exploits the relationship between a physical leakage and the secret intermediate value of an encryption algorithm. In order to prevent side-channel analysis, the masking method was proposed. Several masking methods of the ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard encryption algorithm SEED have been proposed, as the Korean financial IC (integrated circuit) card standard (CFIP.ST.FINIC-01-2021) mandates using a robust implementation of SEED as an encryption algorithm against side-channel analyses. However, vulnerabilities were reported, except for with only one masking method. This study proposes the first-order vulnerability of that masking method. That is, an adversary is able to perform a side-channel analysis with the same complexity as an unprotected implementation. In order to fix this vulnerability, we revise the masking method with negligible additional overhead. Its vulnerability and security are theoretically verified and experimentally demonstrated. The round key of the existing masking method is revealed with only 210 power consumption traces, while that of the proposed masking method is not disclosed with 10,000 traces.
The major factors that determine the performance of the second-order correlation power analysis (SOCPA) include the accuracy of the power model and the correlation between the hypothetical intermediate value and preprocessed power consumption. Because of the tradeoff between the accuracy and correlation, the correlation coefficient of the general SOCPA using 8-bit SubBytes output is only up to 0.35. Therefore, based on the operational characteristic of the cryptographic algorithm, we propose to find a special intermediate value, called sparse intermediate value (SIV). The SIV significantly improves the performance of the SOCPA because it accurately models the power consumption while the correlation coefficient is 1.00. Further, the experimental results on OpenSSL advanced encryption standard (AES) show that the SIV-based SOCPA can disclose the entire secret key with only about a quarter of the power trace required by the general SOCPA.
31 July 2024 in The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science