Keon-Hee Choi

Mr. Keon-Hee Choi

financial information security, Kookmin University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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14 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Shuffling is an essential countermeasure employed during the implementation of cryptographic algorithms to mitigate vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks, regardless of the algorithm’s nature. However, a comprehensive and structured shuffling framework has yet to be established, resulting in the need for developers to create customized solutions adapted to their specific algorithmic or operational requirements. This research paper introduces an innovative and systematic shuffling framework, providing developers with a set of guidelines to effectively select suitable shuffling methodologies aligned with their specific objectives. Additionally, we illustrate the application of this framework to the CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature algorithm, a finalist in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. By leveraging our framework, we devise shuffling countermeasures and present an extensive array of twelve shuffling schemes. For each scheme, shuffling techniques are applied universally to all operations involving any confidential data, regardless of existence of known attacks targeting corresponding data. We also measured the performance of implementations of our shuffling schemes, the minimal overhead is 12.4%.

27 November 2024 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to the security of conventional public-key cryptosystems, driving the demand for quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a multi-year competition, ultimately selecting four ciphers. Among these, Falcon employs cumulative distribution table (CDT) sampling, which produces arrays of random values derived from a discrete Gaussian distribution during the signature generation phase. This array is then used with secret key information, forming the core of Falcon. Enhanced variants of Falcon, such as Mitaka, SOLMAE, and Antrag, implemented CDT sampling using comparison operations. Previous research by Choi et al. proposed a single trace analysis and countermeasure for CDT sampling, which exploited a non-constant-time vulnerability in 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. However, this vulnerability is specific to certain environments, and a potential vulnerability in comparison-operation-based constant-time CDT sampling remains unstudied. This paper is an extension of that study. This paper investigates the constant-time operation of comparison-operation-based CDT sampling on Arm Cortex-M4-based chips and proposes a deep learning-based side-channel analysis to recover the sampling values using a novel vulnerability. The proposed model achieves an F1 score of 1.0 and a recovery success rate of 99.97%.


31 July 2024 in The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
JKJu-Hwan Kim
Ju-Hwan Kim
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
한국전자파학회논문지 (The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science)

23 October 2024 in Preprints.org
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to the security of conventional public-key cryptosystems, driving the demand for quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions. In response, NIST conducted a multi-year competition, ultimately selecting four ciphers. Among these, Falcon employs CDT sampling, which produces arrays of random values derived from a discrete Gaussian distribution during the signature generation phase. This array is then used with secret key information, forming the core of Falcon. Enhanced variants of Falcon, such as Mitaka, SOLMAE, and Antrag, implemented CDT sampling using comparison operations. Previous research by Choi et al. proposed a single trace analysis and countermeasure for CDT sampling, which exploited a non-constant-time vulnerability in 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. However, this vulnerability is specific to certain environments, and a potentioal vulnerability in comparison operation based constant-time CDT sampling remain not studied. This paper is an extension of that study. This paper investigates the constant-time operation of comparison operation-based CDT sampling on Arm Cortex-M4-based chips and proposes a deep learning-based side-channel analysis to recover the sampling values using novel vulnerability. The proposed model achieves an F1 score of 1.0 and a recovery success rate of 99.97%.