JongHyeok Lee

Dr. JongHyeok Lee

Kookmin University, Republic of Korea
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2020 in Applied Soft Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han

1 June 2020 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HLHanSeop Lim
HanSeop Lim
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Theoretical process of fault injection attacks is defined as a process of recovering a secret key assuming that an attacker can inject faults into a specific targeted operation. Therefore, an artificial triggering is required to execute such an attack. However, when conducting analysis on real devices, artificial triggering needs to rely on a powerful assumption, such as manipulation of internal codes. In this paper, we propose a novel fault injection system using Input/Output (I/O) signals of target devices as a trigger for relaxing an attacker assumption. This system does not require an implementation of artificial triggering as input signals are used as a trigger in transmission of plaintexts for fault injection attacks. As a result, the attacker can perform fault injection attacks concerning the entire encryption process. To decide the fault injection time based on the trigger, the proposed system applies simple power analysis (SPA), employing electromagnetic emission of target devices. Considering that the fault injection time identified by SPA can be relatively vague compared with that obtained using a system based on an artificial triggering, we address this problem by proposing a process to recover the secret key without knowing the byte index of an injected fault.

23 November 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSeonghyuck Lim
Seonghyuck Lim
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Recently, as the number of IoT (Internet of Things) devices has increased, the use of lightweight cryptographic algorithms that are suitable for environments with scarce resources has also increased. Consequently, the safety of such cryptographic algorithms is becoming increasingly important. Among them, side-channel analysis methods are very realistic threats. In this paper, we propose a novel differential fault attack method on the Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA) cipher which became the ISO/IEC international standard lightweight cryptographic algorithm in 2019. Previously proposed differential fault attack methods on the LEA used the Single Bit Flip model, making it difficult to apply to real devices. The proposed attack method uses a more realistic attacker assumption, the Random Word Error model. We demonstrate that the proposed attack method can be implemented on real devices using an electromagnetic fault injection setup. Our attack method has the weakest attacker assumption among attack methods proposed to date. In addition, the number of required fault-injected ciphertexts and the number of key candidates for which exhaustive search is performed are the least among all existing methods. Therefore, when implementing the LEA cipher on IoT deivces, designers must apply appropriate countermeasures against fault injection attacks.

14 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Shuffling is an essential countermeasure employed during the implementation of cryptographic algorithms to mitigate vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks, regardless of the algorithm’s nature. However, a comprehensive and structured shuffling framework has yet to be established, resulting in the need for developers to create customized solutions adapted to their specific algorithmic or operational requirements. This research paper introduces an innovative and systematic shuffling framework, providing developers with a set of guidelines to effectively select suitable shuffling methodologies aligned with their specific objectives. Additionally, we illustrate the application of this framework to the CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature algorithm, a finalist in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. By leveraging our framework, we devise shuffling countermeasures and present an extensive array of twelve shuffling schemes. For each scheme, shuffling techniques are applied universally to all operations involving any confidential data, regardless of existence of known attacks targeting corresponding data. We also measured the performance of implementations of our shuffling schemes, the minimal overhead is 12.4%.

15 November 2018 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YWYoo-Seung Won
Yoo-Seung Won
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Integrated circuit (IC) chip cards are commonly used in payment system applications since they can provide security and convenience simultaneously. More precisely, Europay, MasterCard, and VISA (EMV) are widely known to be well equipped with security frameworks that can defend against malicious attacks. On the other hand, there are other payment system applications at the national level. In the case of the Republic of Korea, standards for financial IC card specifications are established by the Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institute. Furthermore, security features defending against timing analysis, power analysis, electromagnetic analysis, and TEMPEST are required. This paper identifies side channel leakages in the financial IC cards of the Republic of Korea, although there may be side channel countermeasures. Side channel leakages in the financial IC cards of the Republic of Korea are identified for the first time since the side channel countermeasures were included in the standards. The countermeasure that is applied to the IC card from a black box perspective is estimated to measure security features against power analysis. Then, in order to investigate whether an underlying countermeasure is applied, first-order and second-order power analyses are performed on the main target, e.g., a S-box of the block cipher SEED that is employed in the financial system. Furthermore, the latest proposal in ICISC 2017 is examined to apply block cipher SEED to the financial IC card protocol. As a result, it is possible to identify some side channel leakages while expanding the lemma of the paper accepted in ICISC 2017. Algebraic logic is also constructed to recover the master key from some round keys. Finally, it is found that only 20,000 traces are required to find the master key.

13 February 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
CJChi-Gon Jung
Chi-Gon Jung
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
YJYoungjin Ju
Youngjin Ju
YKYong-Been Kwon
Yong-Been Kwon
SKSeong-Woo Kim
Seong-Woo Kim
YPYunheung Paek
Yunheung Paek