24 May 2023 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
At-home screening systems for obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) can bring convenience to remote chronic disease management. However, the unsupervised home environment is subject to spoofing and unintentional interference from the household member. To improve robustness, this work presents SIENNA, an insider-resistant breathing-based authentication/pairing protocol. SIENNA leverages the uniqueness of breathing patterns to automatically and continuously authenticate a user and pairs a mobile OSA app and a physiological monitoring radar system (PRMS). SIENNA does not require biometric enrollment and instead transforms the respiratory measurements taken during the user’s routine physical checkup into breathing biometrics comparable with the PRMS readings. Furthermore, it can operate within a noisy multitarget home environment and is secure against a co-located attacker through the usage of joint approximate diagonalization of eignematric-independent component analysis, fuzzy commitment, and friendly jamming. We fully implemented SIENNA and evaluated its performance with medium-scale trials. Results show that SIENNA can achieve reliable $(>90$ % success rate) user authentication and secure device pairing in a noisy environment against an attacker with full knowledge of the authorized user’s breathing biometrics.
17 July 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
With the accelerating adaption of Cloud and Edge computing, cloud-based networked deployment emerges to enable providers to deliver services in a cost-effective and elastic manner. However, security concern remains one of the major obstacles to its wider adaption. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) has been advocated to protect cloud services in an isolated execution environment. In this paper, we present a new genre of side-channel attack called interface-based side-channel attack and demonstrate its effectiveness on the TEE-assisted networked service system. The root cause of this attack is the input-dependent interface invocation (e.g., interface information and invocation patterns) that can be observed by untrusted software to reveal the control flows inside the enclave. Our evaluation demonstrates that the attack can effectively re-identify encrypted web pages processed in the SGX enclave with an accuracy of 87.6% and a recall of 76.6%, and can reduce the search domain of the 1024 bits RSA private keys to $1.69 \times 10^{-6}$ of the original search domain. As countermeasures, we propose, implement and evaluate a set of static analysis tools to mitigate the newly discovered threats. The key idea is to use inter-procedural dataflow analysis to identify potential leakage via the interface, and then mitigate them during compilation using techniques including branch obfuscation, loop obfuscation, and constant size wrapper.