Sangyub Lee

Mr. Sangyub Lee


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SKSeongkwang Kim
Seongkwang Kim
JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
MSMincheol Son
Mincheol Son
BLByeonghak Lee
Byeonghak Lee
DMDukjae Moon
Dukjae Moon
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee
Post-quantum signature schemes based on the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm are recently attracting significant attention as their security solely depends on the one-wayness of the underlying primitive, providing diversity for the hardness assumption in post-quantum cryptography. Recent MPCitH-friendly ciphers have been designed using simple algebraic S-boxes operating on a large field in order to improve the performance of the resulting signature schemes. Due to their simple algebraic structures, their security against algebraic attacks should be comprehensively studied. In this paper, we refine algebraic cryptanalysis of power mapping based S-boxes over binary extension fields, and cryptographic primitives based on such S-boxes. In particular, for the Gröbner basis attack over ⅇ2, we experimentally show that the exact number of Boolean quadratic equations obtained from the underlying S-boxes is critical to correctly estimate the theoretic complexity based on the degree of regularity. Similarly, it turns out that the XL attack might be faster when all possible quadratic equations are found and used from the S-boxes. This refined cryptanalysis leads to more precise algebraic analysis of cryptographic primitives based on algebraic S-boxes. Considering the refined algebraic cryptanalysis, we propose a new one-way function, dubbed AIM, as an MPCitH-friendly symmetric primitive with high resistance to algebraic attacks. The security of AIM is comprehensively analyzed with respect to algebraic, statistical, quantum, and generic attacks. AIM is combined with the BN++ proof system, yielding a new signature scheme, dubbed AIM. Our implementation shows that AIM outperforms existing signature schemes based on symmetric primitives in terms of signature size and signing time.

9 December 2020 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DPDong-won Park
Dong-won Park
NCNam Su Chang
Nam Su Chang
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
Seokhie HongSeokhie Hong
Seokhie Hong
In this paper, we present a highly optimized implementation of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) over NIST P-256 curve for an 8-bit AVR microcontroller. For improving the performance of ECC implementation, we focus on optimizing field arithmetics. In particular, we optimize the modular multiplication and squaring method exploiting the state-of-the-art optimization technique, namely range shifted representation (RSR). With optimized field arithmetics, we significantly improve the performance of scalar multiplication and set the speed record for execution time of variable base scalar multiplication over NIST P-256 curve. When compared with previous works, we achieve a performance gain of 17.3% over the best previous result on the same platform. Moreover, the execution time of our result is even faster than that over the NIST P-192 curve of the well-known TinyECC library. Our result shows that RSR can be applied to all field arithmetics and evaluate the impact of the adoption of RSR over the performance of scalar multiplication. Additionally, our implementation provides a high degree of regularity to withstand side-channel attacks.

19 November 2021 in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KSKyung-Ah Shim
Kyung-Ah Shim
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
NKNamhun Koo
Namhun Koo
A signature scheme based on multivariate quadratic equations, Rainbow, was selected as one of digital signature finalists for NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Round 3. In this paper, we provide efficient implementations of Rainbow and UOV using the AVX2 instruction set. These efficient implementations include several optimizations for signing to accelerate solving linear systems and the Vinegar value substitution. We propose a new block matrix inversion (BMI) method using the Lower-Diagonal-Upper decomposition of blocks matrices based on the Schur complement that accelerates solving linear systems. Compared to UOV implemented with Gaussian elimination, our implementations with the BMI result in speedups of 12.36%, 24.3%, and 34% for signing at security categories I, III, and V, respectively. Compared to Rainbow implemented with Gaussian elimination, our implementations with the BMI result in speedups of 16.13% and 20.73% at the security categories III and V, respectively. We show that precomputation for the Vinegar value substitution and solving linear systems dramatically improve their signing. UOV with precomputation is 16.9 times, 35.5 times, and 62.8 times faster than UOV without precomputation at the three security categories, respectively. Rainbow with precomputation is 2.1 times, 2.2 times, and 2.8 times faster than Rainbow without precomputation at the three security categories, respectively. We then investigate resilience against leakage or reuse of the precomputed values in UOV and Rainbow to use the precomputation securely: leakage or reuse of the precomputed values leads to their full secret key recoveries in polynomial-time.

14 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Shuffling is an essential countermeasure employed during the implementation of cryptographic algorithms to mitigate vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks, regardless of the algorithm’s nature. However, a comprehensive and structured shuffling framework has yet to be established, resulting in the need for developers to create customized solutions adapted to their specific algorithmic or operational requirements. This research paper introduces an innovative and systematic shuffling framework, providing developers with a set of guidelines to effectively select suitable shuffling methodologies aligned with their specific objectives. Additionally, we illustrate the application of this framework to the CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature algorithm, a finalist in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. By leveraging our framework, we devise shuffling countermeasures and present an extensive array of twelve shuffling schemes. For each scheme, shuffling techniques are applied universally to all operations involving any confidential data, regardless of existence of known attacks targeting corresponding data. We also measured the performance of implementations of our shuffling schemes, the minimal overhead is 12.4%.

2 January 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
SCSung Min Cho
Sung Min Cho
HKHeeSeok Kim
HeeSeok Kim
Seokhie HongSeokhie Hong
Seokhie Hong
Advanced collision-based single trace attacks which can be applied on simple power analysis resistant scalar multiplications become virtual threat on elliptic curve cryptosystems recently as their practical experimental results are increasingly reported in the literature. Since such attacks are based on detecting collisions of data dependent leakage caused by underlying long integer multiplications, so-called global shuffling countermeasure which breaks such collision correlation by independently randomizing the execution order of unit operations such as single precision multiplication and carry propagation, is considered as promising countermeasure if theoretical randomness of shuffling order is guaranteed. In this paper, we firstly analyze the practical security of the global shuffling long integer multiplications by exhibiting a combined single trace attack on software implementations on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our combined attack consists of a simple power analysis for revealing random permutation vectors which enables later collision-based single trace attack. First we demonstrate how to reveal random permutation vectors for carry propagation process of whole global shuffling long integer multiplications within a single power trace by simple power analysis accompanied with straightforward substitution of power consumption samples. Then we perform collision-based single trace attacks after rearranging the order of subtraces for unit carry propagations based on revealed permutation vectors. Since the vulnerability to simple power analysis is originated from the if-statement for selection of proper entries of the permutation vectors, we propose a novel countermeasure which eliminates such selection with simple addition and modulus operation and also demonstrate practical result achieving regularity in power trace patterns.

3 April 2019 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
SCSung Min Cho
Sung Min Cho
HKHeeSeok Kim
HeeSeok Kim
Seokhie HongSeokhie Hong
Seokhie Hong
We analyze the security of RSA prime generation implemented on embedded devices by a practical power analysis attack. Unlike previous differential power analysis-based attack on primality tests of RSA prime generation exploiting the deterministic relationship among multiple prime candidates manipulated by consecutive primality tests, we propose a collision-based power analysis attack on the Miller-Rabin test for a single prime candidate which can recover the secret prime with a single attempt by exploiting collision characteristics of simple power analysis resistant modular exponentiation algorithms. Hence, our attack does not require the incremental prime search assumption and is applicable when countermeasures against previous attacks are deployed since it also does not require the assumption of trial divisions with small primes on prime candidates. For a realistic setting, where five 512-bit modular exponentiations are operated on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller as recommended by FIPS 186-4 standard, we successfully recover the secret exponent to an extent that a feasible exhaustive search is needed for the full recovery of the secret prime. This is a first practical result of recovering a full secret of modular exponentiation which manipulates 512-bit RSA primitives with collision-based power analysis in a single attempt, where the previous attack demonstrates the result for 192-bit ECC primitive implementations. We also present a countermeasure against our attack which requires only one additional modular subtraction for the loop of square-and-multiply-always exponentiation algorithm. An experimental result for the effectiveness of our proposed countermeasure is presented.