Jihoon Cho

Jihoon Cho

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Jihoon Cho

Security Research Team, Samsung SDS, Seoul, South Korea

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SKSeongkwang Kim
Seongkwang Kim
JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
MSMincheol Son
Mincheol Son
BLByeonghak Lee
Byeonghak Lee
DMDukjae Moon
Dukjae Moon
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee
Post-quantum signature schemes based on the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm are recently attracting significant attention as their security solely depends on the one-wayness of the underlying primitive, providing diversity for the hardness assumption in post-quantum cryptography. Recent MPCitH-friendly ciphers have been designed using simple algebraic S-boxes operating on a large field in order to improve the performance of the resulting signature schemes. Due to their simple algebraic structures, their security against algebraic attacks should be comprehensively studied. In this paper, we refine algebraic cryptanalysis of power mapping based S-boxes over binary extension fields, and cryptographic primitives based on such S-boxes. In particular, for the Gröbner basis attack over ⅇ2, we experimentally show that the exact number of Boolean quadratic equations obtained from the underlying S-boxes is critical to correctly estimate the theoretic complexity based on the degree of regularity. Similarly, it turns out that the XL attack might be faster when all possible quadratic equations are found and used from the S-boxes. This refined cryptanalysis leads to more precise algebraic analysis of cryptographic primitives based on algebraic S-boxes. Considering the refined algebraic cryptanalysis, we propose a new one-way function, dubbed AIM, as an MPCitH-friendly symmetric primitive with high resistance to algebraic attacks. The security of AIM is comprehensively analyzed with respect to algebraic, statistical, quantum, and generic attacks. AIM is combined with the BN++ proof system, yielding a new signature scheme, dubbed AIM. Our implementation shows that AIM outperforms existing signature schemes based on symmetric primitives in terms of signature size and signing time.

14 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JLJongHyeok Lee
JongHyeok Lee
JHJaeseung Han
Jaeseung Han
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
KCKeon-Hee Choi
Keon-Hee Choi
DHDong-Guk Han
Dong-Guk Han
Shuffling is an essential countermeasure employed during the implementation of cryptographic algorithms to mitigate vulnerabilities against side-channel attacks, regardless of the algorithm’s nature. However, a comprehensive and structured shuffling framework has yet to be established, resulting in the need for developers to create customized solutions adapted to their specific algorithmic or operational requirements. This research paper introduces an innovative and systematic shuffling framework, providing developers with a set of guidelines to effectively select suitable shuffling methodologies aligned with their specific objectives. Additionally, we illustrate the application of this framework to the CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature algorithm, a finalist in NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. By leveraging our framework, we devise shuffling countermeasures and present an extensive array of twelve shuffling schemes. For each scheme, shuffling techniques are applied universally to all operations involving any confidential data, regardless of existence of known attacks targeting corresponding data. We also measured the performance of implementations of our shuffling schemes, the minimal overhead is 12.4%.

11 August 2025 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JKJihoon Kwon
Jihoon Kwon
SLSangyub Lee
Sangyub Lee
BLByeonghak Lee
Byeonghak Lee
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
JCJihoon Cho
Jihoon Cho
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming increasingly critical for securing Internet of Things (IoT) applications against potential threats posed by quantum computers. However, cryptographic schemes based on mathematically hard problems, such as lattice-based constructions, may face reduced security margins due to ongoing cryptanalytic advancements. In IoT use cases requiring long-term deployment without guaranteed secure updates, symmetric-based signature schemes, such as $\mathsf {SPHINCS+}$ , whose security relies solely on symmetric primitives, are considered robust alternatives. Among these, $\textsf {AIMer}$ , selected as a finalist in the KpqC competition, is emerging as a promising candidate. This article presents optimized software implementations of $\textsf {AIMer}$ for various IoT platforms, ranging from low-end to high-end devices. We propose memory-optimized and time–memory tradeoff implementations for resource-constrained ARM Cortex-M4 devices, and single instruction multiple data (SIMD)-accelerated implementations for AArch64 and AVX2 architectures. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive performance evaluation comparing our optimized implementations with other PQC signature schemes. Our results show that $\textsf {AIMer}$ achieves significantly smaller signature sizes and faster key generation and signing compared to $\mathsf {SPHINCS+}$ across all security levels, making it a viable option for long-term IoT deployment.

7 October 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SMSeokhyeon Moon
Seokhyeon Moon
MLMyungho Lee
Myungho Lee
JKJihun Kim
Jihun Kim
YJYoon-Chan Jhi
Yoon-Chan Jhi
JCJihoon Cho
Jihoon Cho
HOHakjoo Oh
Hakjoo Oh
Adopting automated Java unit-test generation in industrial settings requires high coverage, readability, token efficiency, and modern-Java deployability. No existing technique meets all four: search-based test generators struggle with readability and modern-Java deployability, LLM-centric generators consume tens of millions of tokens, and prior LLM-based test refactoring methods drop baseline coverage by 8–21 percentage points (pp) in our controlled setups. We report on EvoLLM, a hybrid Java unit-test generator we built and deployed to address all four requirements. EvoLLM combines EvoSuiteng—a failure-analysis-driven hardening of EvoSuite that resolves deployability issues and strengthens baseline coverage—with cluster-wise LLM-based refactoring that groups tests by coverage goals and rewrites each cluster in a single LLM call grounded in compact program-under-test context. Across six open-source and three industrial projects, EvoLLM outperforms six state-of-the-art baselines, improving line coverage by 8.2–20.7 pp, branch coverage by 6.2–19.4 pp, and mutation score by 6.8–24.5 pp, while reducing LLM token usage by 47.3%–93.0%. In addition, the test generation stage of EvoLLM demonstrates robust deployability across target projects built with JDKs 8, 11, and 17, while achieving strong effectiveness on a Spring-core release requiring JDK 17. Finally, a 14-participant developer survey further suggests that EvoLLM-generated tests ranked higher in readability than those from prior tools and developer-written tests.